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ABSTRACT

PREFACE
The study of the Chinese monetary system has "been to
me both an awakening and an interesting study. Before working
on this subject, I was afraid that I could hardly get the re-
ference books.
This thesis covers the development of China* s mone-
tary system up to the Slno-Japanese war in 1937. I have two
purposes in mind:
(1) Research into the historical evolution of mone-
tary units.
(2) Tracing of remote causes for the introduction of
uniform bank-notes.
To Professors C. P. Huse and M. S. Dalano, my advi-
sers in this work, I wish to deeply express my gratitude for
their suggestions and kind assistance.
BOSTON UNIVERSITY
Boston, Mass., JUI7, 1949
Kung-Chin Chen

Chapter I
HISTORICAL DEVSLOPtlSI^T OP MONETARY SYSTEJiT
China's civilization as we know, dates from pre-his-
toric time. With the Chou dynasty, starting about 1122 B.C.,
we begin to touch upon the true history of the Chinese people.
In this prosperous flourishing period, the Chinese social and
political institutions became fixed and a feudal system grew
up. Commerce, art, religion and philosophy flourished. The ir-
on weapons and implements came into use which have greatly in-
fluenced the monetary system in early China.
Statements made concerning the development of curr-
ency in the pre-historic period are largely a matter of conjec-
ture. Before the Chou dynasty various media of exchange existed
in China; nearly every possible material is recorded as the
circulating currency, such as inscribed skins, tortoise shells,
1
axes, spades, bells, armlets, rings and rolls of silks. Comm-
odity money is supposed to have been in circulation even as
early as 2,000 3.C. and during 1,500 and 1,000 B.C., silver and
copper money was in circulation in addition to cowrie shells,
gold seems to have been considered as currency only from the
2
eleventh to the third century B.C. Money did not circulate as
the medium of exchange until about 1032 B.C. V/e hear at that
1. Lee, P. E., Currency
,
Banking and Pinance in China
U. S. Department of Commerce, V/ashington, 1926, p. 27.
2. Morse, H. B. , The Trade and Administration of Chi-
na, Longmans, Green & Co., 1920, p. 136.
il

2time the earliest marked legislation on coinage, the sovereign
having established certain regulations for currency, and en-
acted that metallic pieces should be exchangeable according to
3
their weight. This was the beginning of the real money and
currency used in China. There is no fixed standard of currency,
in the broad sense of the word, within China. The masses in the
interior provinces, pratically all through their lives had ne-
ver used paper money and copper cions. Although on the other
hand, there was no law to define the term of "currency" as app-
licable to China, we have reason to believe that the copper
coin as widely used, actually was the real currency of the
coimtry. Gold and silver had been long used as the medium of
currency in other parts of the world, but did not take part in
the main currency system of China imtil the Republic era, when
the currency system was gradually reformed and changed by the
new government.
(A) Copper
(1) In Ancient Time
Counting bronze as a form of copper, we can say that
copper is the metal which for thousands of years has formed
the basis of China's principal currency system. The original
shapes for monetary units were formed after primitive articles
of husbandry, notably the spade, the bell and the knife. These
were at first uninscribed barter money and turned, after having
3. Lee, fT S., op. cit., p. 28.

circulated In that state for centuries, into inscribed money.
The investigation concerning the earliest attempts
on the part of China to introduce metallic currency, is rend-
ered difficult by lack of authoritative evidence. The only av-
ailable sources of information on this particular subject are
the old Chinese Chronicles. "According to the Shih Chi of his-
torical records of Ssu-mu Ch'ien it is stated that the media of
exchange of the Emperor Shun (2255 B.C.) and of the Hsia Dy-
nasty (2205—1818 B.C.) were three kinds of metal -— yellow
(gold), white (silver) and red (copper). Copper money is said
to have then existed in three categories namely Chien, Pu and
4
Dao'.'
According to Terrien De Lacouperie, the first att-
empt to introduce metallic currency in ancient China dates back
to about 1100 B.C. In the Tslen Han Shu (the annals of the for-
mer Han Dynasty) the historical statement is contained that "
gold was in square inch, weighing one kin, bronze money was
round, tongue like and in squares (or ingots) and these weights
5
were ascertained by Tchus". So that from these statements it
may be said that the first Chinese round bronze coins were pro-
duced during the Chou Dynasty, the latter existed from 1122 to
255 B.C. The first round bronze coin in China was about an inch
in diameter and had a square hole in the center. It was origin-
4. Lochart, Stewart., The Stewart Lochart Collection
of Chinese Coins
, 1915, p. 21.
5. Lacouperie, Terrien de., Catalojapie of Chinese Co-
ins. First seventh century B.C. to A.D. 621, p. 35.

ally the prerogative of the government to cast copper cash, hut
on certain occasions town coiincils, guilds and other corperat-
ions, were permitted to carry on minting as a private enterp-
rise. Furthermore, comparatively speaking, the beginning of co-
inage in the Occident dates back to 750 3,0., when Pheidon, King
of Argos established a mint for metallic currency; these early
coins were bean-shaped, stamped with a distinctive emblem, fiind
minted from silver and also from electrum. Prom these statement
it may be seen that China was the first of all the countries in
the world to create metallic currency.
For more than 2,000 years the hole copper cash fai-
thfully served as a medium of circulation throughout China. When
the price of the metallic ingredients began to surpass the face-
value of the copper coins, there was an attempt to melt the la-
tter down and sell the metal. This tendency was accelerated du-
ring the World War I when enormous quantities of copper cash
were collected in China. In order to be melted 6uid exported ab-
road as metal, China, especially, the province of Shantung, was
almost denuded of its copper currency, principally the old cash.
(2) In Modern Time
After having been in touch for centuries with West-
ern nations and after having had the opportunity of observing
the advantage which a regulated currency system provides, Chang
Chi-t*ung, one of the most enlightened statesmen China ever po-
ssessed, introduced the first modem minting plant in Canton
(A.D. 1889), when he was Viceroy there. The machinery was ord-

-5
ered from England and minting operations were started in the
summer of 1890. The production hy Canton mint of modem copper
coins marks an importsmt stage in the development of China's
coinage system. The first one cent copper coin was intended to
replace the old fashion copper cash (without a square hole in
center) and to form a sub-division of the Chinese dragon dollar.
Induced by rapid success of the new one cent coin, and encou-
raged by the Peking Government, many of the provinces erected
mints of their own and developed feverish activity in minting
the new copper cent coins. Contemporary with the coming of peace
in 1901, after the Boxer rebellion, was the signal for far-re-
6
aching reforms in every branch of China's national life. Their
output of new copper-cent was readily taken by the people, not
only at the face value of 100 to the dollar, but not infrequent-
ly at a premium. They were in such heavy demand that prior to
1905 about 80 copper cash could be exchanged for a dollar prac-
tically all over China. However, the success and the minting
profits obtained by the provinces, which were in possession of
minting plants, caused jealousy amongst some of the governors
of other less fortunate provinces. This led to the Importation
of further minting machinery and to feverish activity, result-
ing in the output of enormous quantities of copper coins. Mints
increased rapidly and coinage of money because a favorite means
of raising revenues by the provincial authorities. By that time.
6. Wei, Wen-pin, Currency Problem in China, Long
Green & Co., 1914, p. 41.

the first signs of overproduction and lack of uniformity made
coinage depreciate from the original value. The success of the
new one-cent piece was shortlived.
Finally the Governemnt was roused to take action. The
I decision was reached to reform the country^ s currency. The re-
|gulation was granted by Imperial approval; the rules relating to
copper coinage provided that there should be no more new copper
mints and that those already existing should be permitted to
continue operations in accordance with a set of uniform rules.
linfortxmately in fact, the currency regulation was never carried'
Into effect. The new coin has brought much loss and misery on
the hard-tried population of the country. The year of 1909 was
one of the most critical periods for the minting of coppers; the
j supply had become super-abundant, the market being flooded with
coppers. Most of the mints were forced to discontinue work tem-
7
porarily.
In 1910, the Government issued another currency re-
\
form act by the terras of which the existing copper coins were
I
to be permitted to circulate for fev/ years, while the reformed
coins were gradually being introduced. But this act like many
iother reform measures, was never carried into effect. Since the
Republic of China has been established, this copper coinage can-
not be considered as a medium of exchange based on a clearly de-
fined standard, but simply as a commodity, subject to continual
;
7. Ksmn, E., The Currencies of China
,
Kelly and Walsh
Co., Shanghai, China, 1928, PP. 399-435.

7fluctuations.
(3) Silver Tael
In the first place, in the discussion of history of
the tael, it must be borne in mind that for most of the period
under discussion, no coin represented tael. As a coin it did
not exist imtil in comparatively recent times. The word "tael"
signifies a measure of weight and also a medium of currency in
In silver. The tael or liang as the Chinese term means ounce
and Is characterized by variation from place to place. But the
tael was also a unit of silver money circulating in China, and
its fineness, size and value varied from place to place. In
other wards, it represents a very complicated mechanism of fin-
ance.
The existence of silver as a medium of payment in
China dates back nearly 5,000 years. But it was not regulated
currency until modern times. History records that "silver all-
oyed with tin, was coined in 119 B.C. b;,'- Yuen Shou in Three De-
nominations; 1, 3,000 cash round in shape and with a round hole
in the center. 2, 500 cash square in shape, weighing six liang,
and aborned with a horse. 3, 300 cash, oblong, adorned with a
8
tortoise and weighing four liang". The face-value of these co-
ins far exceeded their intrinsic value and they were soon count-
erfeited by the people. After a short while they were no longer
accepted In circulation.
8. Kann, E., op.cit., p. 235.

Before the reign of the Hsla and Shang Dynasties (
B.C. 1990—1050) three kinds of money were in existence, name-
ly* gold, silver and copper. Furthermore, according to Terrien
de Lacouperie (catalogue of Chinese coins, 1892) Wang Mang, who
had dethroned the infant emperor, assuming in his own name the
supreme power in A.D. 10, brought about radical changes in the
Empire *s cirrency. He stipulated that the silver unit currency
was one lin, weighing eight taels. The weight was fixed, while
the value varied according to the purity of the metal.
During the reign of the Southern Sung Dynasty, in
1193, the silver coins were minted in weights of 1, 2, 3, 5 and
10 taels and the value of each tael was fixed at 2,000 cash.
These coins were intended as circulating medium for the settle-
ment of commercial transactions and as official Government as
9
well as metallic reserve for paper notes in circulation.
In 1367, Ming Tai-tsu, in order to maintain the pa-
per currency, he attempted to prohibite the use of silver cu-
rrency. Nevertheless, silver came into extensive use as curr-
ency under the Ming Dynasty, and since the establishment of the
Manchu Dynasty most large transactions and treasury operations
been conducted in silver.
From 1500, a great deal of the silver stock in China
had directly come from foreign trade with the V/estern countries
beginning at Canton in 1516, first with the Portuguese. During
that time, the tea and silk trades brought into China a steady
9 . Kann, E., op.cit., p. 236.

9Importation of silver. It is generally estimated that the im-
ports of goods never equaled the exports of tea and silk during
the 18th century. The balance was always paid in silver. Mr. H.
B. Morse estimated that the total importation os silver into
10
China from 1700 to 1830 could not be less than |500,000,000.
^Iso Sir Robert Giffen gave some interesting facts about the
movement of the silver. He found that concurrencly with the ex-
port of gold, China was importing silver and that there was an
excess of imports over exports of silver. This excess was 5,300,
1
000 in 1877, the largest balance of the seven years he studied.
From this statistical evidence it appears that China has been a
regular silver- importing country.
The quantities of silver which have been mined in
China are negligible. Therefore, practically all of the white
metal in circulation in China has had to be imported from abroad
in the shape of silver bars. But for many decades London held
the monopoly as the principal silver market of the world. Since
the World War I, New York has surpassed London in its import-
ance as a silver market. The main source of silver production Is
the United States of America and Mexico, wMch combined, equal
nearly two-thirds of the world's output.
China was £Ln important consumer of silver; she ranks
with British India, according to Customs statistics covering
10. Statistical Secretary of the Chinese Maritime
Customs, China & Par East, Clark University Lectures, 1910,
PP. 96-97.
11. Royal Commission on Gold and Silver, Minutes of
Evidence, p. 29.
L

10
the years 1888-1934, inclusive. Her total imports for bar sil-
ver were valued at Tls. 2,280,283,000, and her total exports
for bair silver were valued at Tls. 820,662,000. Therefore her
net imports were Tls. 1,459,621,000, for fourty-six years, thus
12
marked an annual average of 31,730,000.
It can be ascertained that these silver bars were
13
directly employed in China in the following manner:
Silver Bars for coinage in China 78^.
Reshipped abroad 5/^.
And conversion into silver sycee 17^.
(1) The Tael of Weight
As mentioned in the beginning of this section the
tael in the Chinese system is a measure of weight- In weighing
the precious metals, it is the heaviest unit and it has decimal
sub-division, each with its own name down to the one thousand-
million-millionth part of tael. Those in daily use are as fol-
lows :
10 Li (cash) 1 Pen (Candarin)
10 Fen 1 Tsien (Ivlace)
10 Tsien 1 Liang (Tael)
Through lack of governmental regulation the tael has
come to be in the course of time very irregular in weight. The
purity of the silver bullion is also liable to variation. Thus
commercial usages have come to recognize several degrees of
fineness in the bullion in every important market. However, the
Chinese Government, in 1844, when fixing the rates of exchsmge
12. Kwei, C. S., The Chinese Year Book 1935-1936
,
(in Chinese), Shanghai, China, 1936.
13. Ibid.,

at which foreign currencies would be received in payment of cu-
stoms dues, ascertained that 20 Ruppe coins were equal to the
weight of 6.203 Canton taels. As the weight of 20 Ruppe was
3600 Grains troy, it follows that the Canton tael equals 3600/
14
6*203 — 580.036 Grains or 37.585 Grains. So that the Canton
tael weight is generally used for weighing bar silvers.
(2) The Tael of Currency
The use of silver as currency in China began in the
|
Sung Dynasty, but it was made in the form of a sycee-shoe, not
as coin which practice was maintained even during the latter
period of the Tsing Dynasty. Sycee-shoes are circulated accord-
ing to weight. After trade was established with foreign countr-
ies, the currency tael was the principal medium for financing
wholesale transactions and for the payment of customs duties in
China, but in the majority of cases circulates in shoes of about
50 taels or liang in which was converted imported bar silvers.
However, it must be understood that there was never a fixed ra-
tio established between the cash (copper) and the tael.
It must be remembered that the tael was not only a
standard of value, but also a measure of weight, long before it
ever became the standard of value. The nature of the Government
in China meant very little regulation. There was no uniformity
in the several taels current in the different parts of the coun-
try. The trade in China, both internal and external has always
been double faced; business between one province and another,
14. Kann, E.
,
op.cit., pp. 63-64.

12
but even two districts in the province, has had to take coimt
of not only the value of commodities hut also the value of mo-
ney. When a merchant from Shantung buys piece-goods in Shanghai
he has not only to fix the value of the commodity he buys in
money, but also the value of money he has to pay in term of the
local currency. The value of money or the tael is regulated by
the weight as well as purity and local custom; this transaction
in taels implies the use of the bullion in bar silver or sycee.
The amoujit of alloy to be used in the manufacture of
sycee or the purity of the silver bullion, varies with the usa-
ge in different commercial ports. For instance, the silver in
the Wenchow tael is 561.7 Grains, but the silver in the Amoy
15
tael is only 516 Grains.
Until recent years the Chinese Government had made
no attempt to issue coins in silver in the manner in which it
is done in other countries, finally the Government abolished
the system of tael currency.
(3) Variety of Principal Taels
Having briefly reviewed the history of the silver
tael, I should like to further discuss the different kinds of
principal taels which are used primarily for commercial trans-
action. All taels of silver in China, however, not of even
weight or even fineness, each city or commercial guild ports
were to be levied according to commercial treaties. Mr. K.B.
Morse, who for many years was Commissioner of Custom in China,
15. Kann, E., op.cit., p. 50.

has stated that there were no fewer than 170 different kinds of
taels in China, 67 well recognized standard with their value in
16
terms of one another.
For practical purposes we need consider only four
Important kinds of taels as follows:
a. The Haikwan Tael
The Haikwan tael is the principal one used in fore-
ign business in China. This tael is used in payment of tariff
duties. Its value was fixed in the year of 1842. Theortically,
this tael is one of pure silver, 1,000 fine, containing 583.3
Grains, adopted as a money of account. Though the duties are
calculated in this unit. The rate of conversion at Shanghai
17
port for every 100 Haikwan taels is 111.40 Shanghai taels.
But the rate of conversion for Haikwan tael in foreign curren-
cies is determined by the Customs authorities each month, based
upon current exchange rates, for instance, in January 1925, the
18
United States one dollar equals 1.20 Haikwan tael.
b. The Kuping Tael
The money of account of the Chinese Government was
the Yuan dollar and the currency regulations prescribe that in
all public offices, where the reciepts and expenditures were
calculated in taels, the amount should be converted into terms
of Yuan dollars. This provision applies also to all collected
16. Lee, P. E., op.cit., p. 14.
17. Ferguson, J. C, "The Chinese Bank System in
Shanghai", North China Daily Herald , March 2nd. 1906, pp. 473-
498.
18. Lee, F. E., op.cit., p. 15.

14
revenues and taxes. Hence the Kuping taels were being supplant-
ed by the Yuan dollar.
The Kuping tael or Board of Revenue tael contains
575.8 Grains of silver, 1,000 fine. The Kuping tael compared
with the Shanghai tael is in the ratio of 100 Kuping to 109.60
19
Shanghai taels.
c. The Tsaoping Tael
The Tasoping tael is not a currency but is in reality
a weight of approximately 565.65 Grains and becomes the weight
element of a currency tael in the several provinces which pay
in commodities, mainly rice and silk. In some cases, however,
the Tsaoping tael is used in Shanghai area by native bankers
as a basis for exchange transactions with other ports of China,
and is fully current and fully recognized at Shanghai. It is
ordinary currency for Chinese remittances through Chinese banks
to places in China. It is in regular use at Chefoo and the
standard is 976, at Kii:ikiang and Wuhu 944, at Hangchow 997.
Practically speaking, 98 Tsaoping taels of silver are counted
20
and universally accepted as 100 Shanghai currency taels, be-
cause this ratio is regulated by agreement.
d. The Shanghai Tael
The local tael of greatest importance in mercantile
transactions in China was the Shanghai tael. This tael was also
the standard of International exchange for the trade of Ivorth-
19 . We i , V;en-pin, op.clt., p. 38.
20. Morse, H. B., op.cit., p. 173.

15
ern China and the Yangtze valley. The value of the Shanghai ta-
le was made up of three elements; the weight, the quality of
silver, and a convention ratio. The weight is taken from the
Tsaoping tael of 565.65 Grains, the silver is then reduced to
a standard of 944 fine on the Kuping tael basis of 1,000 fine,
and the convention is that 98 taels of this weight sind this
silver settle a liability of 100 taels "Shanghai Convention
Currency." In other words, 98 taels in hand are worth 100 in
21
bush. Hence it made the Shanghai tael actually 523.428 Grains
of silver, 1000 fine (Kuping).
In order to fully understand what is a Shanghai tael
of foreign exchange, for instance, an ounce of British standard
(1925) silver contains 444 Grains of fine silver. The par of
silver exchange is found by dividing the London price by
22
0.864.
(C) Silver Sycee
The word of "sycee" is derived from the Cantonese
pronounciation of Hsi-su meaning "fine silk". Practically, all
the sycee taels in circulation in China are made from imported
bar silver. The latter is shipped to China as ingots in the
shape of bricks, weighing approximately 1,000 ounces each, and
being of a fineness of from 996 to 999 thousandths. The manu-
facture of sycee taels was entrusted to a few privileged private
21. Morse, H. B.
,
op.cit., p. 179.
22. Loh, K. H. , The Trade and International Relations
of the Chinese Empire
,
(in Chinese)
,
Shanghai, China, 1908,
p. 161.

smelters, called Loofang, who worked without Government control.
The conversion of bar silver into sycee results in
the creation of silver ingots, called shoes or sycee, the wei-
ght of each being approximately 50 taels. Before being put into
circulation each shoe was weighed and assayed by the public as-
say-voffice (also free from Government control), called Kung-Ku-
Chu. The weight and the fineness of at least 0,935 was cast in-
to ingots which were recorded in Chinese ink, the finding of thei
23
I
assayer being accepted as final.
Sycee represented the tael currency of China. It is
j
difficult to ascertain the origin of the sycee tael, but history
recorded that the close of the 13th century was the period in
which silver in the shape of the sycee-shoe made its first app-
©arence in China. The weight of each individual shoe differed
somewhat, and so did the fineness, but both were recorded on
the face of each ingot by Chinese inks.
The sycee tael which has served — and served well —
as currency in China nearly a thousand years, is really archsic
In constitution and since has been replaced by modern coinage
and mostly the Chinese Republican dollars were minted from sil-
ver sycee. So that gradual disappearence of the sycee as medium
[
of currency is coming out of natural causes. Before the year of
1934, the only three big cities where sycee taels still form
part of banks cash were Shanghai, Tientsin and Hankow. But at
the close of 1934, Shanghai baiiks held altogether taels 29 mi-
23. Kann, E., op.cit., p. 60.

llion in the shape of sycee. Hankow and Tientsin combined not
more than about 5 million taels. Estimated the stocks of sycee
silver in the rest of China at 5 million taels. i^o that it had
at a maximums of 39 million sycee taels for the whole of China
area.
(D) Silver Dollars
(1) Carolus and Mexican Dollars
In the beginning of the sixteenth century, Spanish
traders, from their base in the Philippine Islands, introduced
to China the Carolus dollar which succeeded in maintaining its
status in Shanghai until 1856. By that time it had reached a
premium of over 30 percent, thereby causing much harm to legi-
timate trade.
Prom 1757 A.D,, when Canton was opened a port for
foreign trade, the Spanish dollar gained wide circulation. These
Carolus dollars were paid for such exports as tea, silk and por-
celain among other Chinese products. The Spanish dollar thus
became the valuable currency for international transactions and
bahk*s exchange quotations were likewise based thereon. In the
course of time the Spanish dollar, as the only silver coin in
circulation penetrated into the interior provinces of Kwangtung,
Pukien, Kiangsu, Chekiang, Anhui and Chihli, and until 1856 It
was the local currency along the Yangtze valley. Afterwards, the
minting of the Carolus dollar having been discontinued in the
latter part of the 19th century, supplies became scarce and pre-

18
mlimis were demanded in China, hence causing the gradual repla-
cement of the Carolus dollars by either silver sycee or the ri-
val coins, so that the local value of Carolus dollar was advan-
ced to premium varying between 20 or 30 percent above the in-
trinsic value of the coin. Naturally, a serious dislocation of
trade was created at this moment.
However, in 1855 the Shanghai Taotai issued a pro-
clamation, decreeing that all dollars be accepted in payment
without distinction, as long as they were identical in fineness !
and weight. Moreover it was ineviabible that the Mexican and
some South American coins entered China, likewise through CantonI
whence they spread up to the Yangtze basin. It was a well-known
fact that the Mexican dollar had won the fight effectively re-
placing the Carolus dollars. The principal causes for this phe-
nomenal success was the superior fine content of silver as founi
in the Mexican dollar, and its uniformity and reliability during
the many decades of its existence. The widest circulation was
attained by the Mexican dollar in China. By 1911, the total num-
ber circulating there was estimated at 500 million.
In 1914, the Chinese Republican Government having
been established, a new formidable rival to the Mexican dollar
arose in the shape of the Yuan Shih-kai dollar. Since then the
Mexican dollar began to vanish from circulation in China, but
at the opening of 1935 Mexican dollars were still acceptable at
Shanghai, and these coins were only very rarely met with, having
24
25
24. State Governor
25. Kann, op.cit«, p. 145.

previously been exported or melted down.
As the Mexican dollar legally weighs 417,8 gramme rs
and be 902,65/72 fine, its content of pure silver ought amount
to 377,14 grains. But by the analysis undertaken by the Chinese
Mint, the gross and net weights of the Mexican dollar are as
26
follows
:
1, 0.7284 Kuping taels weight or net 0.6569 Kuping
taels
.
II. 0.7222 Kuping taels weight or net 0.6534 Kuping
taels
(2) The American Trade Dollar
Parallel with the success attained by the Mexican
dollar, the silver resources of the United States began to
developed. In order to find a market for their huge output of
silver the mine owners petitioned the Congress in 1873 to have
,
I
their surplus silver coined by the Government Mint for special
i
requirement for the Par ^ast, when the Mexican dollar ruled su-
preme and the demands on the part of Eastern commerce are so
great. Under these circumstances the United States Government
decided to issue the American Trade dollar, which met a spleddid
reception in the Chinese ports, superseding the Mexican dollar
in the course of time. i
The AmericEin Trade Dollar was minted at a weight of
420 Grains or 27.215 Grams, being 0,900 fine, this means that
its content of fine silver was 378 Grains, as compared with
27
377-i^ Grains of pure silver contained in the Mexican dollar,
26, Kann, S,, op.cit., pp. 146-147.
27. Ibid., p. 131,

However, when the American Trade Dollar was produced
in 1873, it was worth, at the ratio of exchange then prevailing
a little over ^. 1.04 in United States gold. Thus it made the
coin not only popular and widely circulated in China. But in
the year of 1877, because the United States Government had ne-
ver decreed Trade Dollar as the legal tender, its issue was
hastily discontinued. However, a small portion of coins circu-
lating in China was reshipped to the United States, while the
major part ended in the melting pots of Cathay.
The various dollsirs described so far were of foreign
origin, though they had a considerable circulation in, and great
influence over, certain parts of China. Apart from the foregoing
speciments there were still other foreign silver dollars such
as Bolivian, Chilian, Peruvian, British Dollars and Japanese
Silver Yuan, current in certain districts of Chinese commercial
ports but these existed just for a short time and to a small
extent only.
liii Chinese Dollar
The first Chinese silver dollar was minted strange
enough, in Tibet, in the 57th year of Chien Lung (Tsing Dynasty)
it was called the "Chien Lung precious treasury coin". Minting
on a large scale began in the 17th year of Kwangtung, the coin
was called the "Kwang-hsu Yuan Pao precious coin" weighing
75 candareens Tsaoping tael. Other provinces followed suit, but
the different weights and fineness cansed confusion. At last in
the 29th year of Kwang-hsu an effort was made to unify the wei-

ght and fineness. An edict was issued to establish a head Mint
at Tientsin to unify the form of dollar. The head Mint was com-
pleted in the year of Kwang-hsu and was called Hu-pu ( Finance
28
Board) head Mint.
The success attained by the foreign dollar coins in
China induced the then Viceroy of Canton, Chang Chih-tung to
petition the Throne in 1887 for permission to coin Chinese do-
llars, for the purpose of turning out copper cash which failed
to obtain the favor of the public acceptance with the resulting
discontinuance of the minting. Furthermore Chang pointed out
that throughout almost all provinces of China the Mexican Dollar'
ruled supreme and that the appearance of the newly proposed
Chinese drafon dollar would tend to dislodge the foreign curren-
cy. The petition was finally accepted by Imperial sanction;
whereupon the Canton mint began in 1889 to strike the first dra-
gon dollar.
The gross weight of the new coinage, styled Kwangsu
currency, was 0.73 Tsaoping taels or 0.724455 Kuping taels; its
content of fine silver weighed 0.6540 Kuping taels, which cor-
responds to the fineness of the Mexican Dollar, viz. 902.7/1000
29
ths. It was decreed the new dragon dollar which gained wide
circulation should be the legal tender and acceptable as such
in payment of taxes, customs dues and official salaries. In the
course of time, however, it lost popularity on account of lack
28. Woodhead, H. G. W. , China Year Book 1921-1922
,
The Tientsin Press Co. LTD., Tientsin, China, T^2S", p. 302.
29. Kann, E.
,
op.cit. p. 150.

of uniformity and owing to systematic debasement "by some of pro*
vincial mints. Also with the fall of the Imperial regime the
Ta-ching or dragon dollar had to vanish. Then the Board of Fin-
ance promulgated the regulations and laws in the second year of
Hsuan Tung (1910) to a new and uniform the Chinese standard do-
llar. It provided that the new standard coins sholud be styled
"Yuan", also known as Ta Ching Yen Pi (silver coin of the Ta
Ching Dynasty)
.
The new standard dollar was to weight 0.72 Kuping
30
taels and to be 0.900 fine. The mints at Wuchang and Nanking
started to strike the standard Yuan in July 1911, with the in-
tention of putting it into circulation during December of the
same year. Unfortunately, the Nationalists revolution broke out
in October 1911 and the new Ta Ching Yuan dollar, though still
in circulation, was reduced to little signigicance till the
Sino-Japanese war in 1937.
The Republican regime necessitated the issusmce of a
new dollar. This resulted in the minting of the Yuan Shih-kai
dollar which made first appearance at the end of 1914. It has
succeeded in replacing not only the Mexican and other foreign
dollars, but also the heterogeneous collection of Chinese dragon]
dollars. The new Yuan Shih-kai dollar was to be 0.900 fine and
to weigh 72 csmdareens in Kuping taels; that is to say, the con-
31
tent of pure silver was to be 0.648 Kuping taels in weight.
30. Kann, E., op.cit., p. 154.
31. Ibid., p. 159.
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In order to facilitate the introduction of the new
Yuan Shih-kai dollars the Government arranged that the Bank of
China, the Bank of Communication and the official provincial
banks should exchange, free of charge, the old dragon dollars
against the new Yuan Shih-kai dollars. This measure was wel-
comed by the commercial community, as it facilitated the intro-
duction of the new coin. During the period from 1914 to 1919
about 19 million dragon dollars and foreign dollars were melted
by the mints for re-coinage into the new dollars. But different
methods were adopted by the various provincial mints with the
result that the Yuan Shih-kai dollars were found somewhat diff-
erent one from another. Consequently there was a distinct want
of uniformity, although the legally fixed standard was fairly
well maintained and the coins were circulated everywhere in
China without dispute.
The regime of Yuan Shih-kai Government passed away
which caused the rising of Dr. Sun*s Nationalists Party. The
new Sun Government instructed the provincial mints at Hangchow
and Nanking to cease coining the Yuan Shih-kai dollar and to
produce instead a dollar piece with the effigy of Dr. Svn Yat-
sen. At Nanking for the purpose of producing the first National
Republican commemoration coin, during the year of 1928 about
150 million Sun Yat-sen dollars were coined at Hangchow and
Nanking. The Sun*s Government was making endeavour to procure
suitable designs for a Sun Yat-sen dollar which was meant to
serve as a model for introduction of uniform dollar all over
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the country.
The year of 1928 up to 1932 witnessed coinage by the
Hangchow mint of about altogether 400 million mol>e Sun Yat-sen
dollars. But on March 1, 1933 the national Sun*s silver dollar
began to renew the model and to be struck at the Shanghai Mint.
On the observe it bears a reproduction of a bust of Dr. Sun
Yat-sen, while the reserve is a domed with a Chinese jimk at
sea.
The latest new standard dollars were 880/lOOOths
fine, had a gross weight of 26.6971 Grammes and contain 23.49-
3448 grosses of pure silver. Its fine silver content equals
Shanghai taels 0.6992365, while its minting charges amomt to
32
2^, thus making the dollar the equivalent of taels 71.50. On
March 10, 1934, the new dollar was first delivered to the Cen-
tral Bank of China, and it was to be coined by the Shanghai
Mint exclusively.
Unfortunately, this renewed model of the national
standard dollar has peacefully served in China for, but a few
years. Finally with the chaotic conditions of the Chinese in-
ternal economic and political situation, and as influenced by
the adoption of Silver Purchase Act by the United States, the
old Chinese silver system was entirely abolished. The silver
dollar hence appeared no longer in the Chinese monetary system.
32. China, Ministry of Finance, Annual Report for
the 2l3t and 20th Fiscal Years
,
July 1932 to June 1^34
, Nanking,
China, 1935, p. 15.
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(E) Gold
During China's early history gold has always been
held in high esteem amongst China's canmercial coramiinity as an
indisputable basis for the liquidation of financial obligations.
Although gold was never recognized in China as early as 1100 B.
C. as a measure of values it became subsequently a suitable me-
dium for circulation.
According to the well known Orientalist Terrien de
Lacouperie, who basis his statement on the Annals of the Former
Han Dynasty, gold was first legalized as a medium of circulation
in 1092 B.C. And he has stated again that in 221 B.C., the King
of Tsin issued of new currency; gold in the shape of small cu-
33
bes called Yh. These Yhs were weighed on Kin (Chinese catty).
In 10 A.D. Wang Mang established new sorts of curren-
cy in gold, silver, tortoise shells, cowries and copper in or-
der to replace the knife money. The gold currency unit was ca-
lled Kin and had the value of 10,000 cash.
From time Immemorial, apart from minted gold there
is, and has been for centuries, a more or less extended use of
gold leaves. These were manufactured in South China, principally
from imported gold coins. They were first melted and then re-
fined so as to be as near as possible 1,000 fine. Gold leaves
are easily hidden and in case of danger, carried unobserved on
the body of a person. Hence they formed an excellent object for
33. Ksuin, E.
,
op.clt., p. 259.

hoarding.
While gold coins were never actually issued for cir-
culation throughout the entire domain of China, they have tem-
proarily circulated as recognized medium of exchange within
certain provinces or dependencies of the vast country.
Since 1850 recording have witnessed the issues of
the following gold coins within the domain of China:
a. Taiping tael coin issued at Nanking during the
Taiping rebellion. The denomination was not embossed on the co-
in which was meant to represent 25 taels in silver.
b. The first gold coin, tilla, was introduced in
Chinese Turkstan during Yakub Beg»s rule there 1870-1877. It
bore Mahammedan inscriptions and the portrait of the Sultan of
Turkey.
c. In 1919 two gold coins in denominations of #. 10
and 20, fineness 0.850, bearing the effigy of Yuan Shih-kai
were minted in Tientsin. They were intended to serve currency
prupose, but with the collaspe of Yuan Shih-kai' s Government
to become Emperor the plan to circulate the gold coins were
abandoned.
d. Due to the World War I silver supplies eased to
reach the far-off province of Yuaman. Therefore the military
Governor Tang Chi-yao issued towards the close of 1919 about
900,000 gold coins of a denomination of ^i^. 10 each. A second
gold coin, inscribed 5 dollars. Shortly thereafter, both bearing
the portrait of Tang with the fall of silver price, holders of
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these coins promptly sold them, these coins were melted down
34
and the gold was exported again.
e. In commemoration of the revolution various coins
were struck with the bust of Sim Yat-sen. Amongst these were
the one dollar and the 20 cent-piece in silver. Both coins were
also minted in gold and bear distinctly the character of med-
allions.
In conclusion, these were many attempts to introduce
the gold standard currency in China but none of the numerous
plans was capable of realization. Consequently there never was
a gold coin circulating throughout China as legal tender. Apart
from the coins already mentioned, there was an issue of numerous
gold medallions in celebration of memorable events; but these
rank merely as souvrenirs.
(F) Gold Bars
Of numerous importance to the country's international
exchange engagements is the use of gold bars in China. Origina-
lly these appeared in the shape of shoes with a high degree of
fineness. It is a favoured form of investment for the people,
because it does not deteriorate in substance, it never loses
value through change of fashion; it is easily hidden or hoarded
in case of danger and it offers the possibility of a chance to
sell at a profit.
When gold began to be turned out in the form of small
34. Kann, E.
,
op.cit., p. 272.

bars weighing about 5 or 10 taels each is a recent story, app-
earently dating back only one or two centuries. Each bar is em-
bossed with the firm name of the smelter besides the year in
which it was manufactured and the characters, meaning literally
"surface gold", for instance, gold containing alloy, but actua-
lly standard gold.
As the amount of gold mined in China is negligible
in quantities, it is necessary to import in the shape of foreigr
gold coins in order to produce gold bars. The import into China
of gold coins is solely a question of parities and therefore a
problem of arbitrage. Gold bars could be exported from China to
any country willing buy them at the seller's price. There are
no restrictions placed in the way by the Chinese Government,
and there is no duty imposed on gold shipments, inward or out-
ward, by the Custom. But since 1930 the gold export from China
in any shape was prohibited by the Government and the embargo
is still in force at precent time. The Custom in turn Issued
the import and export value of gold in terms of the Custom Gold
Unit since the Institution of an embargo on the export of gold
in 1930. However, gold bar was exported by the Central Bank of
China exclusively, under Government licence.
The following table covering movements of gold to
and from China, from 1890-1925 inclusive, has been compiled
from offical Chinese Maritime Custom publication. First of all,
the value of gold imported and exported is in conformity with
old established usage, given in Custom currency, in Haikwan
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taels of silver.
E.K. Taels
Total imports of gold from 1892 to 1925 266,778,000.
Total exports of gold from 1892 to 1925 555,748,000 .
Difference 86,970,000.
Net total import of gold from 1890 to 1925 98,047,000.
Net total export of gold from 1890 to 1925 190,495,000 .
Excess of export over import from 1890 to 1925 -92,446,000.
Since the export and import of gold was prohibited
by the Chinese Government in 1930. There was no available fi-
gure published.
The beginning of 20th century, the principal market
for gold bars is Shanghai, where huge transactions are daily
concluded.
There are two main kinds of gold bar universal acce-
ptable .
a. Red gold bars — - this means gold as nearly as
posible 1,000 fine, for use in goldsmiths' workshops. Transact-
36
ions are concluded per Ping.
b. Shanghai gold bars there are supposed to be
of a fineness of 0.978 and of a weight of 10 Tsaoping taels per
bat. Transactions are concluded per Ping or by multiples there-
37
of.
35. Kann, S.
,
op.cit., pp. 276-277.
36. Each Ping is 50 Tsaoping taels. Shanghai in wei-
ght but the price quoted for red gold is per 10 Tsaoping taels.
37. One Ping consisted of seven bars weighing 70
Tsaoping taels, therefore we can buy, for instance, 49 bars,
105 bars or 700 bars, but not 100 or 500 bars.
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(G) Paper Money
The history of bank-notes in China undergoing many
stages is very long. The first appearance of paper money went
far back to the time of Emperor Hsien Tsing (806-821 A.D. ) of
the Tang Dynasty. The immediate cause for the innovation was a
chronic shortage of copper money. In exchange for coin the Go-
vernment issued certificates of deposits which were called Fei
Ch'ien or Flying Money. The populace found these certificates
very convenient, so that these notes gradually become part of
the circulation. The certificates were redeemable in the capital
of every province, thus embodying of a bank notes, the first
' 38
issue of paper money in China.
The Sung Dynasty in 960 A.D. , followed the Tang and
begun issuing a new kind of paper money, called Pien Ch^ien or
Convenient Money. Originally these notes were issued as inter-
provincial transfers for the convenience of merchants who depo-
sited metallic money and obtained in exchange paper money re-
deemable at a provincial capital. 7/hen these notes became gener-
ally current and very popular, the Government began to make the
issue expressly for general circulation. The Government made
large metallic reserves which were kept in order to prevent de-
preciation. The highest amonnt of notes in circulation at no
39
time exceeded 2,830,000 Kuan, each Kuan nominally 1,000 cash.
38. Morse, H. 3., op.clt., p. 151.
39. Wagel, S. R. , China Currency And Banking, Korth
China Daily News and Herald, Shanghai, 1915, p. 64.
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The province of Szechwan is geographically isolated
and has more than once "been an independent state. Shortly after
the beginning of the Chris tain era iron coins were cast there
and formed the currency for a long period. The iron money was
so that people were very much discontented with these ^eavy co-
Ins. Therefore it was agreed upon that sixteen wealthy business
firms should fom a guild for the purpose of issuing notes, ca-
lled Chiao Tze or Evidence Money. T^^ese notes eoon became, for
all practical purposes, the currency of the province. Pew years
later, the sixteen firms became poor and had to decree their in-
ability to redeem their evidence notes. In order to prevent a
financial detoacle the Government declared that these notes were
inconvertible paper currency and took over the right of issue
from the guild, and established a separate Government office to
manage the issue smd circulation of paper money. The Government
notes thus had circulated for fairly long time. And for a time
at least, the Government should find no difficulty in issuing
as many as it liked. Also in the this period, the prolonged
struggle with the Tartars exhausted the resources of the count-
ry, the Government was more or less forced to resort to the
issue of paper money as a means of raising revenue. However, the
Government attempted to secure financial gain for itself by
means of its control of the monetary system which means to stop
the decline, but all attempts proved futile. Finally the price
of paper money fell ten percent of its face value, due to ex-
cessive issue of the notes. In combination with repeated defects

the Sung Government suffered at the hands of the Chin Tartars.
Prom 1130 until final conquent of the country by the
Mongols, China was divided into two halves the Sung Dynasty
holding the Southern part and the Chin Tartars ruling over the
Northern half. Both of them had to issue inconvertible paper
money for purpose of revenue. The Kuan Tze or Fornties Bill were
Issued in order to pay the troops stationed on the frontier. As
the people had much experience of paper money in the past, these
bills had to be forced into circulation and consequently were
heavily discounted. Besides the Government also issued tea no-
tes, and silk notes exchangeable respectively for tea, grain or
silk, and for such totals as were mentioned in the notes. But
the fronties bills as well as the varieties of notes were ex-
tremely unpopular. Afterwards, the Kuan-tze had to be replaced
by new notes called Hui Tze, which were in four denomination;
the usual 1 Kuan or the 1,000 copper cash notes and 500, 300,
and 200 cash notes. It was decreed that the public dues must be
payable one half in Hui Tze and the other half in metallic cu-
rrency. The object of such a decree was to prevent depreciation
of Government paper. Later on, this regulation was extended to
all business transactions. The Government manufactured the notes
which were stamped with the Treasurer's seal before they were
put into circulation. The Treasurer's seal gave the notes the
character of fiat money It was understood that the Govem-
40
ment had the sole monopoly of the issue of paper money.
40. Wagel, S. R.
,
op.cit., p. 68.

Contemporaneous with the Southern Sungs, the Chin
Tartars ruled Northern China. The Chin Tartars issued inconver-
tible paper money called Ch'ao. These existed in denominations
10,000, 5,000, 3,000, 2,000 and 1,000 copper cash notes for use
in large payments and 700, 500, 300 and 100 cash notes for use
in small payments, or as subsidiary. These notes were supposed
to be redeemable in a new series once every seven years. The
currency of the Chin's was better controlled and more centraliz-
ed thaji that of the Sung Dybasty.
When the Mongols conquered China, they hastened to
repudiate both the Ch*ao and the Kuan paper money. The Mongols
were the founders of the Yuan Dynasty (1279-1367). The first
Mongol notes were issued under the regime of Kublai Khan. The
Pao Ch*ao or the Precious Notes was decreed the sole tender in
which taxes and dues became payable. These notes existed in de-
nominations of from 10 to 2,000 copper cash. However, shortly
after the Kublai Khan passed away in 1284. The new series called
the Pao Ch'ao of Chih Yuan were issued; these new notes were
exchangeable for the old notes at the rate of one to fine, that
is, one note of the new series was to exchange for five of the
old of equal nominal value.
However, a few years later, the Pao Ch'ao of Chih
Yuan notes were so throughly depreciated as to be almost useless
except where the authorities were able to force it on the people
for the payment of heavy taxation. So the evils of heavily de-
clined and irredeemable paper currency caused the solely tried

population to rise In revolt against the Yuan Dynasty. Even
during the dawning years of the Ming Dynasty, they had to con-
tinue using the old paper notes for some time, although the
first Emperor Hung Wu (1368-1399) at first repudiated all the
old paper money. Then the Ming notes were printed, on mulberry-
bark paper, the face value of which was worth 1,000 cash. These
newly issued notes of the Ming Dynasty has peacefully served
quite a long time. But after China had been opened to foreign
trade, the large importation of silver helped gradually to
41
oust the paper money from its high prestige. Rapidly, the
people eagerly welcmoed the resumption of specie pa;j7Tnents and
the paper money was automatically retired. Although in the fol-
lowing regimes of the Ming Dynasty efforts were often made to
re-establishing paper currency, practically everyone of them
failed.
The Ming Dynasty gave way to the Manchus, who ruled
from 1644 up to 1911. An attempt was made to issue paper money,
but it had soon to be abandoned due to the fact that the finan-
ces of the coimtry were extremely bad and counterfeit notes
were widely circulated in the market. Apparently, people still
preferred the specie as a large transaction payments.
During the Taiping rebellion, however, paper money
had once more to be resorted to as a means of raising revenue.
Notes to the value of 1, 3, 5, 10 and 50 taels in silver, and
41. During that time, the silver was valued by weight
and not as coin.

also paper worth 500, 1,000, 1,500 and 2,000 In copper cash
were forced into circulation. Within a few years after such
issue the notes depreciated very heavily to the worth of only
30^ of their face value. Because most people gave highly pres-
tige to silver and gold at ths time of riots, the paper money
very soon disappeared from circulation. Since the revolution,
paper currency conditions have become a great deal worse that
before on account of the issues by the provincial, local and
private banks of a large amount of bank notes which has served
as media of exchange, but viiich was not backed by sufficient
reserve funds. The inescapable result was that these paper
notes had been heavily discounted and confused, and the people
still trusted the silver dollars or taels as large domestic
transaction payments.
In 1931, the method of issuance of paper notes was
reformed, requiring issuing banks to hold specie reserves for
at least 60 percent of their notes issue, besides 40 percent
in readily negotiable bonds. On account of this provision, the
chaotic situation of the paper currency was gradually improved
and their overissue stopped.

Chapter II
PROPSSSOR KEIvDvIERSR'S PROJECT FOR THE GRADUAL INTRO-
DUCTION OP A GOLD STAI^DARD CURRENCY SYSTEM IN CHINA
(A) General Background of Reforms
During the early years of the 20th century, the cu-
rrency of China could not, properly speaking, be called a sys-
tem. It was composed of a number of currency units. There were
the cash copper coinage, the currency of silver bullion based
on the tael unit; the silver coins, the dollars of foreign as
well as of provincial mintage; meanwhile there were several mi-
nor silver coins, fractional parts of the dollar circulating
Independently of the unit and with no limitations upon their
legal tender. And finally there were various kind of banknotes
existing in the market. We may, however, regard the Chinese
currency system as on a ''oimetalllc basis with the copper cash
and the silver tael as the units. This must not be mistaken for
real bimetallic system which, it is understood in the West, re-
quires free coinage of gold and silver, both as legal tender
with a fixed ratio between the units of coinage. But the two
metals in the Chinese currency system, on the contrary, were
independent of each other and circulated without? a fixed ex-
change ratio between them.
However, after the Boxer upheaval the tendency be-
came discernible to institute reforms into many branches of
domestic life; formost amongst them were intended reforms with
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regard to the country's currency system. Colncldentally, with
the depreciation of the copper cash piece came the high cost of
living as a natural sequel to trade and cultural relations with
the Occident. The minted copper coinages has ceased to act as
the people's daily money in the principal ports and larger
towns of China; factory wages and salaries were beginning to be
quoted in silver dollars. Gold bullion is, and has been circu-
lating in China from ancient time and more than ever before, a
factor of prime importance in the liquidation of China's inter-
national transaction.
Since 1929, in common with every country, China su-
ffered from the world wide economic depression. For China the
depression is aggravated because silver, the basic currency of
the country, has fallen to unexpected low levels. On the other
hsuid, the foreign demand for Chinese products was much reduced
forcing the national income to a low level. Furthermore the
Government was engaged in the most serious internal civil war
due to the feudal reaction of the Northern militarists and
Communist outbreaks in the South provinces. As a result, the
military expenditures rapidly increased, while the national
revenue decreased. Hence the national economic life was greatly
Influenced by the above external and internal disturbances,
especially on account of the unstable currency created. There-
fore the Government paid much attention to urgently needed
measures of economic and financial reform. The Ministry of Fin-
ance tried every means to improve and stabilize the chaotic

Icurrency condition to meet this emergency. The National Curren-j
cy Commission was thus created.
The question will arises; which was the real curren-j
cy standard of China, copper, silver, gold or paper money ?
All of these commodities were current within the country having
long history.
Under these uncertain circumstances, the National
Currency Commission has Invited the United States financial ex-
pert to assist. Professor 3. W. Keramerer arrived in China in
1929, studied China* s currency and financial conditions and
suggested plans for an effective improvement of the present
situation. On November 11, 1929 the Commission presented to the
Minister of Finance its report, "entitled the project of law
for the gradual introduction of a gold standard currency system
in China."
Although Professor Kemmerer*s projects have not been
adopted by the Ministry of i-^nance of China, they had large in-
fluence on the later currency reforms In 1935. In the following
pages will discuss and analyze the significant points of Pro-
fessor Kemmerer^s project.
{ B) First Gold Standard Recommended
The propesed Kemmerer reform project contained two
urgent aims, namely, the replacement of China's confused curr-
encies by one uniform and nation-wide system, and the intro-
duction of a gold standard system. The chaotic conditions of
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the Chinese currency was a serious handicap to trade and to
the development and prosperity of the country. The Chinese na-
tional revenue depended wholly on silver, while a large portion
of the country* s obligations were to be counted in gold whcih
had a disturbing effect upon the comtry* s foreign trade. Be-
sides, the Government receipts were almost wholly in terms of
silver, while a large part of the payments were fixed in terms
of gold which made more national wealth flow abroad. With these
great purposes China should adopt the gold standard system.
The project submitted by Professor Keramerer provides
for a permanent retirement from circulation of the various mo-
nies in use within China and the introduction of uniform gold-
currency system for the country.
It is proposed to issue a new gold unit, to be call-
1
ed "sun" v/hich is to contain 60.1866 centigrammes of fine gold,
thereby equalling 40 U.S. cents (2.50 sun equal 1 I. 3. dollar)
2
or Is. 7.7265 pence, or 0.8025 Japanese gold yen.
The project provided for silver coins of one sim,
3
50 and 20 cents; nickel coins of 10 and 5 cents. The minting
of gold coins was not recommended in the project. On the other
hand, it does provide for the maintenancu of the parity of all
Tl Commission of Financial Experts, Project of Law
For the Gradual Introduction of a Gold Standard Currency System
in China
,
together with a ^port in support thereof , submitted '
lEo the National Government throup;h the I.Iinistry of Finance by
the Commission of Financial Experts, December 10, 1929 , The
Bureau of Industrial and Commercial Information, Shanghai,
1930, Chapter I, Article 2, p. 1.
2. Ibid., p. 37.
3. Ibid., Chapter II, Article 5, p. 2.
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coins with the value of a fixed gold unit, and also for a me-
chanism whereby the amount of currency in circulation will vary
in the same manner as the amount of currency varies in count-
ries like the United States of America or Great Britain, based
on the actual ingress and outflow of gold. But the plan does
not provide for the coinage or circulation of gold coins.
The silver sun, which will represent the gold unit
of value and which must at all times be kept at a parity with
this gold unit, is given a gross weight of 20 grams, a mille-
4
simal fineness of 800 and a pure silver content of 16 grams.
As we know, the Sun Yat-sen dollar had a legal v/eight of 26.36
grams, a legal fineness of 890 and a legal pure silver content
of 23.91 grams, the proposed silver svn would have a gross
weight of 74 percent of the legal weight of the Sun Yat-sen
dollar and a pure silver content of 67 percent of the legal
5
pure silver content of this dollar.
(C) The Method of the Gold ilxchange Standard to Apply
All the coins are to be fiduciary. Their parity with
gold is to be maintained by unlimited redemption in drafts on
gold standard nations, or in gold bullion in China at the
option of government. Redemption of coin will be in demand
drafts for not less than 2,000 sun, drawn on the main financial
centers abroad.
i"! The Commission of Financial Experts, op.cit..
Chapter II, Article 6, p. 2.
5. Ibid., pp. 94-95.
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However, a premiiim is to be charged on such redempt-
ion, equalling the shipping of gold from a city in China to the
•city abroad in which the draft is drawn. This measure is deemed
justified by the necessity that, whenever any country has gold
coins in circulation, and the rate of exchange goes to the gold
point, an exporter of gold would have to pay the shipping cost
equal to this premium.
Parallel with this measure, in order to provide the
equivalent of an importation of gold into China, banks acting
as agents of China abroad will be prepared to sell drafts pay-
able in China in gold standard money (sun) charging a premii^m
equal to the cost of shipping gold to China. In this way, the
currency in China will be increased just as effectively as
though gold were actually imported. Exchange fluctuations will
thus be lim.ited to the "gold points" as under a standard with
6
gold coins in circulations.
( D) The Currency Reserve Funds
In order to provide for the redemption of coins as
already mentioned and to provide for the sale abroad of drafts
payable in Chinese money, a gold standard trust fund, amounting
to not less than 35 percent of the coins in circulation is to
to be established. It is to be divided into two parts;
a. A fund consisting of gold and foreign credits
6. The Commission of Financial Experts, op.cit.,
pp. 38-39.
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payable in gold. This tvnd is to be used exclusively for the
redemption of coins in China by means of drafts as previously
stated.
b. A fund consisting of Chinese coins and metal for
coinage purposes, is to create the means of new currency when
the need arises; or take up the slack if the currency should
become redundant and should be presented for redemption in
drafts. Thus it will constitute a buffer fund, regulating auto-
matically the supply of currency in China to changing trade
needs, an excessive drain on part I of the fund will be checked
automatically by a contraction of the tsurrency in China, the
currency redeemed going into part II of the fund where it will
7
be locked up.
(E) Gold Standard to be Introduced Gradually
and the vVithdrawal of Old Paper Money
According to the provision of Professor Kemmerer*s
project, the gold standard is to be introduced gradually, pro-
vince by province. Thereafter, the new money is to circulate
freely and legally used to pay wages, make bank deposits and
for any other transactions. The new money thereafter will be
receivable and payable by the Government at the rate of one
sun for one dollar (silver), unless the Minister of Finance
fixes another rate of conversion, iiixchange banks supplied with
stocks of the new money, will be opened at convenient places
7. The Commission of Financial Experts, op.cit..
Chapter IV. Article 19. p. 10.
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so that the public will he enabled to convert the old silver
money and paper money into new gold standard money at official
fixed rates. These rates may be different for difference pro-
vinces and may be changed from time to time.
The currency reform Commission's project of law pro-
vides for a monopoly of note issue by the Central Bank of
China, after the latter has been reorganized into the Central
Reserve Bank of China. As soon as the currency project becomes
law, all other private, provincial and local banks, cooperat-
ions, firms having issued notes, are not only to stop circulat-
ing these but take immediate steps for the retirement of exis-
ting issues. The final "notes retirement date" is not to be
fixed earlier than the "debt adjustment date" and is to be an-
nounced at least one year in advance to whcih all notes are be
retired at face amount. Whenever notes are badly depreciated in
value, these may under certain conditions be retired below par
8
at rates determined by the Minister of Finance.
The preceding, very briefly stated, are the main
features of the Professor Kemmerer's report on currency reform
project. Also Professor Kemmerer contributed two possible plans
which could be adopted for going over to the gold standard,
each of which is cajjable of many possible variations.
8. The Commission of Financial Experts, op.cit.,
pp. 42-43.

(F) Indirect Plan
The first plan would be to adopt the indirect method
throughout the country. Instead of the existing confused coin-
age, a simple, uniform, honest decimally divided coinage on a
silver standard. Using as the imit of value the present Chinese
national silver dollar, for instance the then Sun Yat-sen do-
llar. After this new coinage had been subsituted throughout the
country for the old coinage, to gradually transform this new
silver standard money into gold standard money. This is essen-
tially the plan adopted by Great Britain for the Straits Set-
tlements in 1903-1906, and is sometimes called the Straits Set-
9
tlement Plan. Although the adoption of a national silver stan-
dard system as an intermediate step toward the establishment
of a gold standard, the main points of the plan permits the
maintenance of a silver standard for domestic purposes and pre-
vents a sudden drop in the value of silver, thus keeping har-
mony with the silver standard.
(G) Direct Plan
This plan would be for China to reform directly from
the existing confused and chaotic currency system to a gold
system, recommending the gold standard exchange promptly in
9. Kemmerer, E. W. , Modern Currency Reform
, pp. 402-
444. (A description of this plan and an account of how it work-
ed will be found in above book.)
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f)articular sections of the country where conditions are more
favorable to such Introduction and then gradually extending it
to other sections until ultimately it should be in operation
throughout the entire country. The main points of this direct
reform of the Chinese currency system are aimed at securing a
unified currency under a single unit on the basis of gold. This
plan is similar to the plan employed in the Philippine Islands
during the years 1903-1906 and is sometimes called the Philip-
10
pine Plan.
The above two major plans were contributed by Pro-
fessor Kemmerer for the purposes of reforming the Chinese cur-
rency system, and each of these could be applied. Both, how-
ever, had the inevitable merits and defects should the Chinese
Government really adopt them. Moreover, I am going to touch
upon the conclusion of these two plans. So far as the indirect
plan was concerned, in the early stages of its operation it
would have less opposition on the part of vested interests and
of the masses of the people than would the direct plan. But
under the indirect plan, for instance. Sun Yat-sen dollar with
which the Chinese public are more or less familiar, would be
increased in quantities and would be gradually substituted in
circulation throughout the coimtry for other kinds of silver
dollars. After the peaceful unification of Sun Yat-sen dollar
in the entire comtry, the final step will be ready to put the
10. Kemmerer, E. W., op.cit., pp. 245-346. (A des-
cription of this plaji and an account of how it worked v\rill be
found in above book.
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direct plan into operation. However, the first in the indirect
plan would he expected less expensive than those of the direct
plan, because there would be no immediate necessity of accumu-
lating a currency reserve, or need for a large portion of loan,
except possibly a modest silver dollars reserve to be used for
redeeming fiduciary silver coins and coins of copper and ni-
11
ckel.
V/hile it is quite sure at the very beginning that
the indirect plan is much better than the direct plan, the ad-
vantages would be but temporary and would continue only as long
as the country should remain on the silver standard. However,
it has only one defect, namely, that it should require a long
period to carry out the indirect plan. On the contrary, the
indirect plan, like the direct plan, would meet at first puplic
resistance to the introduction of new silver standard of the
"sun" dollar. As we understood, there were many kinds of diffe-
rent fractional coins circulating in China, which were contain-
ed different fineness and weight but of the same denominations
The indirect plan of reform as well as the direct plan would
probably need withdrawal from circulation of the existing un-
uniform fractional silver coins. If the fineness of the minted
new silver "suji" dollar is below the old coins, the Chinese
public would like to sell or sumggle the old silver coins
abroad as a commodity. To prevent this, the new silver "sun"
11. The Commission of Financial iixperts, op.cit.,
p. 70.
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dollar might be made nearly 100 percent pure. Then the Govern-
ment would have a chance to lose much seigniorage profit. In
both cases, it would encounter serious obstacles, even finan-
cial panic under the two plans for currency.
Theoretically, that the Kemmerer's plans and pro-
jects were sound enough needs no emphasis; needless to aay, the
direct plan would be preferable, as the past experiences always
showed that it could be successfully put into operation. How-
ever, after the project has been handed over to the Minister of
Finance for a year almost nothing has been done to put the re-
commendations of Professor Keramerer*s project in practice. Be-
sides, it was evident that all such events as the Japanese
aggression in Manchuria, the civil strife and flood in the
Yangtze, and the Huangho, prevented the Kemmerer^s project from
being put into practice, as the political disturbances kept the
Government busily engaged and the people struggling for subsis-
tance, gave little time to think of currency reforms. Moreover,
the Chinese public did not realize that the introduction of the
gold standard system would not immediately improve the chaotic
currency situation. And the Chinese public thought that in
steady introducing the gold standard in China, it would be in-
finitely better to attempt a unification of the currency system
in China first. Much can be reached in this direction with lit-
tle difficulty and great benefit to the v/hole coujitry. So the
tael could be abolished, one uniform silver dollar could be
circulated throughout the country, also the evil of the notes
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issue in the cities of China could be controlled and eliminat-
ed. Because of such public reactions, the Ministry of Finance
was impelled to give up the Kemmerer's projects. Finally, the
Ministry of Finance took the emergency requirement to abolish
the silver tael and create a first notable reform which has
been adopted «?—- the uniform silver dollar as a national stand-
ard currency.

Chapter III
ABOLITION OF THE SILVER TAELS
The fact was undeniable that prior to 1933 a mixed
system of silver tael, silver dollar and banknotes was used,
while the latter notes were issued on the basis of the silver
1
dollar coin minted according to the regulations of 1914. So
far as the silver tael was concerned, we will recall that there
were hundreds of monetary taels in use throughout China, most
of which existed in the shape of silver "shoe" or "sycee" of
about 50, 10, 5 and 1 taels values. Some of them were inherited
from ancient Dyiiasties; some of the taels were made by private
firms without Government supervision and mainly according to
the nature of traditional standard and customs of the locality.
In the course of decades most of China's monetary taels dis-
appeared from circulation by force of circumstances and without
Government interference. By the close of 1933 only four kinds
of monetary taels were still in use, namely, the Shanghai,
Tientsin, Haikwan or Custom and Hankow sycee taels.
So far as the silver dollar was concerned, there
were of different kinds of fineness and weight but with the
same denomination in circulation. In addition to the Chinese-
coined Sun Yat-sen dollars, there were Yuan Shih-kai dollars
1. Kann, E., op.cit., p. 159. ( The silver dollar
or Yuan weighted 27 grams, and had a fineness 988 percent.)
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and dragon dollars which were named according to the various
designs of the dollars respectively. Owing to the increase in
circulation Chinese-coined silver dollars gained in popularity
from year to year until their preponderance as currency unit
become firmly established. Without official interference China
arrived at a currency ratio of 90 to 10, the former figure re-
presenting the percentage of dollars minted, while the latter
stood for taels held in banks' coffers. But actually the silver
dollars were found of different fineness and weight which might
not follow too closely the Government regulations. Even the
small towns suffered from the lack of uniformity in currency
system, not to speak of the system on the national basis. In
general, silver dollars were used in the retail business and
silver taels in the wholesale market. It ought to be considered
that the inconvenient and confusing silver currency prevented
greatly the development of national economy. For convenience
sake and to unify the national currency system and thus to
promote the national economic life, the abolition of the tael
was called for. i-'or another reason it might be asked why the
sycee tael should be abolished ? Because it has outlived its
usefulness. As a currency it csinnot circulate and neither can
it be transfered through banks into the interior of the coun-
j
try. The sycee tael is actually a remnant from the middle ages
j
and as such, it is not adaptable to modern needs.
The question will be raised, would it be harmful to
abolish the tael without replacing it by a reliable silver unit

51
of uniform weight and uniform fineness ? China, before 1935 has
about 1,660,000,000 of silver dollars in circulation which did
not distinguish themselves by uniformity in either design,
weight of fineness. It is intended to dismsintle the provincial
silver mints and strike a new design national dollar to take
the place of the conglomeration of previously old coined dollar
pieces
•
This aim can be realized only by melting up all the
millions of formerly produced dollar coins and reminting them
into the new design national dollar. Keedless to say, owing to
the need of providing for shortage in legal fineness or weight,
multitudes of coins will have to enter the Shanghai Central
Mint for transformation.
In July of 1932, the Minister of Finance appointed
an honorary Committee whose task was to advise the procedure
in connection with the proposed abolition of the sycee tael as
currency in China. In the Spring of the following year, imme-
diately after the practical investigation by this special
Committee the tael was definitely abolished by mandate issued
at the 31st meeting of the Central Political Council, the Mi-
nister of Finance and Special Committee. Then the Ministry of
|
Finance declared that the tael had ceased to serve any useful
purpose, and its continuation as a matter of habit and inertia
had become a source of complication and needless confusion and
expense to the public. The completion of the new modern Central
Mint at Shanghai made it possible to adopt measures for issu-
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ance of standard currency of assured uniform weight and finen-
ess. As th^ basis for this reform the Government promulgated in'
1933 the "Standard Silver Dollar Coinage Law", providing that
the Yuan or new national silver dollar should have a gross
weight of 26.6971 grams of silver 880 fine. That is, containing
2
23«4934448 grams of fine silver.
An order of the Ministry of Finance was Issued the
3
summary of which appears as follov/s:
(I) Notice is hereby given that on and after April
6, 1933 att public and private financial transactions are to
be made in terms of silver dollars and not in taels.
(II) All public and private obligations in Shanghai
entered into in terms of taels and dated before April 6, shall
be payable in dollars at the fixed rate of taels 71.5 to $.100.
All payments and receipts in taels in ports other than Shanghai
shall first be converted into Shanghai taels at the exchange
rate of April 5, and then into silver dollars at the fixed rate
of Tls. 71,5.
(III) Those holding silver sycee may either present
them over to the Central Mint for coinage into silver dollars
or hand them to the authorized banks, the Central Bank of China,
the Bank of China and the Bank of Commimication for exchange
into silver dollars.
2. China, Ministry of Finance, Annual Report for the
gist and 22nd Fiscal Years
,
July 1932 to June 1934
,
Nanking,
China7n[935,
3. Ibid., p. 15.
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Besides, the Chinese Custom had issued a full notice
that beginning from April 6, 1933 sm export duty on outgoing
sycee or foreign bars was levied by the Chinese Custom -— Viz;
2t percent Ad Valorem, but silver dollars and mints bars (0.999
fine) could be shipped free of duty.
At the time of abolition of the tael in April 1933,
arrsingements were made whereby stocks of sycee amounting to
4
Tls. 146,202,036.97 including 9,704 American bars, were re-
gistered at the Central Bank of China by all banking institut-
ions in Shanghai -— both Chinese and foreign. These stocks of
silver sycee are being converted through the Central Bank of
China at the rate of 100 standard dollar equal Shanghai taels
71#5, dollars and other silver species being distributed month-
5
ly Pro Rata to the various banks. At the close of 1934, the
the stocks had been reduced to approximately Tls. 27,400,000
(including 7,980 American bars), equivalent to about ^, 38,000,
000. Part of the reduction, however, was due to exportation of
silver and not to coinage. The monthly output of the mint has I
later been rated at approximately 8,000,000., plus bank's
reserve silver bars valued at about 5p. 4,000,000. At this rate
of conversion, present stocks of sycee and bank's reserve bars
should be completed v/ithin a few months. Further production of
sycee has been prohibited, the Central Mint at Shanghai having
4. American bars contain approximately 1,000 to
1,100 troy ounces, equivalent to roughly Tls. 1,000.
5. China, LTinistry of Finance, op.cit., 1935, p. 15.
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been ordered to close the provincial iMints. The measures taken
constitute an important step toward standardizing the currency.
In general, the abolition of the silver tael in the
Spring of 1933 was a notable reform. The transition to the new
dollar basis proceeded smoothly and without any hardship to the
business community or to the public. Furthermore the abolition
of the silver tael in Chinese currency system \mdoubtedly was
a great stride forward in the monetary history of the country.
It resulted in the unification and the stabilization of the
currency of a fairly limited degree in the Chinese financial
situation. However, it is to be noted that both the nev/ and the
old system namelj^, the dollar system and the mixed form of
tael-dollar system were on a silver standard. However, the pri-
ce of silver was constantly fluctuating and proved to be some-
what uncontrolable by the Government Financial Authorities.
Besides the appreciation and depreciation of silver currency
were directly influenced by the upward and downward movements
of the price of silver in London. Therefore with the above main
purposes, the Chinese Government was seeking for the security
in regard to the fluctuation of the price of silver, and a sil-
ver agreement was signed in London in the Summer of 1933 bet-
ween the Governments of Austrila, Canada, India, Mexican, Peru,
Spain and the United States of America.
(A) London Silver Agreement
As we understood, the theoretical difficulties of
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the silver standard were overcome by the result of our expe-
rience in a period of less than a decade. Our domestid price
and income structures were forced to imdergo tv;o main readjust-
ments according to the revised price of silver, first in an up-
ward direction between 1926 and 1931 when the price of silver
declined by 53.8 percent in New York, and 49.7 perdent in Lon-
6
don and later in a downward direction since 1932. The fluct-
uations in the price of silver proved very disturbing to the
normal functioning of our economic system. Fundamentally, it
may be noted, as long as China was on a silver standard, the
appreciation and depreciation of our currency system were dir-
ectly influenced by the upward and downward movements of the
price of silver in London.
In the Summer of 1953, while the World Economic and
Monetary Conference was held in London and the Chinese Govern-
ment took part in the Conference, a Silver Agreement was signed
between the Governments of Australia, Canada, India, Mexico,
Peru, Spain and the United States of America. This Agreement,
since ratified, "provided that for four years beginning v/ith
January 1, 1934, India should not sell more than 35,000,000
fine ounces yearly on the average and not more than 50,000,000
7
fine omces in any yearj that Spain should not sell more than
5,000,000 fine ounces on the average during four years, and not
6. Lin, W. Y. , L'ew I.'onetar
y
System of China, Kelly
and Walsh Co., Shanghai, CKIna, 1936, pp7TI^12T
7. Tang, L, L. , China New Currency System
,
Kegan
Pual, Trench, Trubner & Co., London, 1936, Apuendix A, Article
la, p. 117.
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8
more than 7,000,000 fine ounces in any year; that the Govern-
ments of Austrtilia, Canada, Mexico, Peru and the United States
of America should not sell any silver during the same period,
and should in the aggregate annually purchase from the market
35,000,000 fine ounces of silver in agreed shares out of their
9
own mine production; and that the Government of China should
not sell silver resulting from demonetized coins during the
10
period. The London Silver Agreement simply indicated that it
was intended to bring about effective stabilization of price
of silver,
( B) China Made Reservation
When the London Silver Agreement was under conside-
ration, the Government of China informally called to the at-
tention of foreign Governments the possibility of joint action
to check the headlong fall of silver. Although efforts to
achieve international co-operation have so far had little tan-
gible restilt, the national Government is ready to co-operate
In any practical measure of stabilizing the value of silver.
Especially, the National Government on several occasions was
in informal communication with the Government of United States
regarded China^s main interest in measures affecting the value
of silver. The Government of China pointed out that any action
8. Tang, L. L.
,
op.cit.. Appendix A, Article 5,
p. 118.
9. Ibid., Appendix A, Article 2, P. 118.
' 10. China, The Ministry of Finance, op.cit., 1935,
p. 16.
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resulting in a rise of China's currency out of relation to the
price of world commodities would have deflationary effects in
China, and would further decrease her already reduced exports
and so impair her ability to purchase goods abroad. Also a rise
of China's exchange would probably increases the heavy silver
exports as a necessary means of settling large unfavorable
balances of international payments. In view of China's inter-
ests in silver, the Government of China would be consulted in
advance if measures concerning silver that might materially
affect China's currency and exchange were in fact being con-
11
template d.
Furthermore in ratifying this Agreement, "the Na-
tional Government of China declared that as silver is the mo-
netary basic of China, the Government of China will consider
itself, at liberty to take whatever action it may deem appro-
priate, if, in its opinion, changes in the relative values of
gold and silver adversely affect the economic condition of
Chinese people, contrary to the spirit of stabilization of the
12
price as embodied in this Agreement'.'
According to this declaration, the Government of
China requested all of the other seven nations to make a pro-
mise of agreeing, not to fluctuate the price of silver either
downward or upward. This might affect the instabilization of
the Chinese silver currency system. If this Agreement could be
11. China, Ministry of Finance, op.cit., 1935, p. 16.
12. Ibid., 1935, p. 16.
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fully carried out, an insignificant fluctuation of price of
silver would be observed and influenced by the different export
and import duties. In other words, the reservation and security
of the Chinese currency were made stabilized and balanced by
the international silver agreenent and international co-operat-
ions.

Chapter IV
Silver Currency Crisis
The abolition of silver taels and the unification of
the national new standard silver dollar or Yuan in the Spring
of 1933 which I fully described in the previous chapter, in
short, the transition to the new dollar basis has proceeded
smoothly and without hardship to the business community or the
i
public. It ought to be noted, at the beginning of 1934, all the
modem style Chinese banks have had their capital paid in dol-
lars. Railway fares were payable in the same currency. Govern-
ment loans within the country constructed in dollars and bonds
were issued in the silver dollar basis. As the silver dollar
gained in popularity, the mediaeval sycee tael was relegated
to the background.
During the period \mder review, China in common with
every other country suffered form the world wide economic de-
pression, the general economic and financial situation unfor-
timately continuing to deteriorate. Especially the price of
silver in terms of gold has fallen by more than half in the
first two years of the unprecedented world economic crisis,
seriously affecting all those who ar involved in foreign trade,
as well as creating difficulties for the government in decrea-
sing imports to meet the growing cost of gold commitments. In
fact, China was, until the second half of 1932, the only coun-
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try which was not directly affected "by the universal economic
crisis. This achievements were due to mainly a mild currency
inflation brought about by a heavy fall of silver values, and
for the fact that the bulk of the population, have little to
do with foreign trade. The sonsequences of the decline in the
gold value of silver have fortunately not attained serious pro-
portions, as the purchasing value of silver for commodities
within the country has not depreciated very much.
In spite of the general depression and the lower
level to which silver has fallen, its connection with the no-
tion of "inflation" could be banished from our midst, since we
enjoyed the benefits of a metallic inflation and not the evils
succeeding a lavish issue of fiat money. China was then suffe-
ring from an oversupply of silver. The metallic inflation in
China was not caused by artificial means. It came about in a
natural manner through the fall in silver prices. Since China*
s
currency was based on silver, the country was greatly benefited
from the decline. As a direct result, internal wholesale com-
modity prices after rising for several years up to 1931 have
been falling, and prices of leading commodities are greatly de-
1
pressed. On the other hand, the depression has come to China
chiefly as a result of external forces affecting the country*
s
economic life, notably the reduced purchasing power of other
nations and the increasing value of China* s silver currency in
terms of leading currencies, influenced by the currency poli-
1. China, Ministry of Finance, op.cit,, 1935, p. 2.
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cies of the governments concerned.
The general downward movement of wholesale prices in
China experienced a serious decline since the end of 1931,
averaging for the six principal cities for which indexes are
currently available at about b% in 1932, 9,4% in both 1933 and
1934.
TABLE I
ANNUAL PBRCMTAGE CHANGE OF WHOLESALE PRICES
IN CHUTA SINCE 1931
1932 1933 1934 1955
North China - 7.9 -10.9 - 8.8 - 2.6
Shanghai -11,3 - 7.7 - 6.5 - 2.5
Canton - 0.4 - 9.2 - 9.6 -15.7
Hankow - 1.8 -12.0 -10.3 0.3
Nanking - 5.0 - 8.5 -12.6 - 0.3
Tsingtao - 3.7 - 8.4 - 8.4 2.6
Average -5.00 - 9.4 - 9.4 - 3.6
Source: Price Index published by the National Com-
mission of Tariff in Shanghai.
The above table of the price movements in the de-
pression years indicates clearly the disturbing and dislocating
consequences of a fall in the general wholesale price level.
It roughly amounted to 22.5;^ for North China and 26.7^o for
2
Shanghai. Thus in fact, the waves of the first two years of
2. Lin, V,, Y., op.cit., p. 12

the world economic depression were kept away from our shores by
the depreciation of the price of silver.
The happy situation suddenly came to an end as soon
as the several commercially important countries went off the
gold standard; since September 1931, silver at once began to
rise in terms of sterling, the rupee, the Japanese yen and,
later, the American dollar; while in terms of gold it continued
to decline imtil 1935.
TABLE II
THE PRICE OF SILVER IN LONDON AND NEW YORK
1931-1935
Year
London Pence Per
Standard Ounce
(0.999 fine)
New York Dollar
Per Fine Ounce
(0.999 fine)
1931 14.7/16 28.700
1932 17.13/16 27.892
1933 19.1/16 34.727
1934 21.5/16 47.973
1935 29.3/16 64.675
Sources Lin, W. Y. , The New Monetary System of China
Kelly & Walsh Co., Shanghai, China, 1936, p. 12.
The question will be raised why and what were causes
for upward and downward movements of the price of silver, which
in turn were the keystones of Chinese silver currenc37- crisis.
More details will be discussed in a later section.
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(A) Fluctuations of Silver and Chinese Exchange
Since China was on a silver monetary standard, the
exchange value of her currency fluctuated in sympathy with the
price of silver. There was no fixed rate for foreign currencies.
For instance, the price of silver per ounce in New York on any
day, multiplied "by the nximber of ounces of silver in the Chine-
se currency unit, determined the parity of exchange for the
day. That is, the amount in U.S. currency which the Chinese
unit would realize if melted and sold as bullion in New York.
The actual exchange rate fluctuated within a range of a few
percent above and below parity, corresponding to the silver im-
port and export points.
After the Chinese Government adopted the standard
dollar or "yuan" in April 1933, it weighed 26.6971 grams, 88%
fine, and contained just over 3/4 of an ounce of fine silver.
Hence the parity of exchange on any day may be found approxi-
mately by multiplying the New York price of silver on that day
by 0.75, that is the value of the Chinese standard dollar
is labelled 75 cents. According to past records, it was evident
that when the price of silver fluctuated 60 cents per ounce,
the exchange of Chinese standard dollar usually was between
40 and 50 cents U.S. currency.
The exchange rate shown below is in relation to the
standard Chinese dollar. For the sake of comparison, figures
prior to 1932 are converted into Chinese dollars from the ori-
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ginal quotations in taels or Chinese ounces of silver.
TABLB III
VALUE OF CHINESE DOLLAR IN U.S. CURRENCY
Year U. S. Currency
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1st. Qtr.
2nd. Qtr.
3rd. Qtr.
4th. Qtr.
0.55
0.50
0.45
0.46
0.42
0.30
0.22
0.21
0.26
0.34
0.36
0.40
0.37
0.32
Source: Tang, L. L. , China' s New Currency System
,
Kegan Paul, Trench, Truhner & Co., London, 1936. pp. 105-106.
(B) Decline of the Chinese Trade hy the Eff-
ects of Silver Exchange Fluctuations
The downward movement in the price of silver in the
beginning of 1930 appeared first to be very harmful to the im-
port trade, because it seemed likely to raise the price of all
imports beyond the point at which China could afford them. On
the other hand, in the general depression world commodity price
inevitably were falling to a lower degree. China was benefited
in that many raw materials could still be imported at normal
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prices in terms of Chinese currency. But the import trade in
some consumers* goods j the world prices of which did not fall
very much and for which domestic prices had once more to be in-
creased with. the fall in exchange rate, suffered considerably.
Howeverm China* s import trade as a whole declined no more than
the world trade.
The Chinese export trade consisting of raw or semi-
manufactured materials, such as silk, bean products, tea, vege-
table oil and raw furs, followed the fall of world commodity
prices. The low silver price made the export possible in the
world market without lowering their price in domestic silver
currency. In fact, one of the causes of the falling price of
silver was the reaction between the Chinese internal prices and
the world prices of the commodity which she exports.
The deprecition of silver resulted in two main chan-
ges in China's exports. At first, there was a steady increase ir
export totals, due to the favorable exchange which stimulated
the manufacture for export before the world economic crisis
brokeout; but when the depression came in the whole world, the
reduction of foreign demand affected China's exports, and thougl
the total quantity exported declined in 1950, the favorable ex-
change greatly mitigated this, and the total value of export
was almost as high in 1930 as in 1929.
At the same time, the quantity of Chinese imports
declined sharply in 1930 and a slight further decline occured
in 1931. Their monetary value however, increased, reaching the
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highest point in the latter year. Reckoned in Chinese dollars,
Chinese foreign trade in 1931 was the largest on record, thourghi
3
the quantity was less than in 1929.
The following table shows that during the years of
depreciating silver and increasing exports, China achieved at
times a favorable trade balance, and that on the whole, these
were not seriously affected by the world economic crisis until
after 1931. In that year the value of Chinese exports, Chinese
imports and China's foreign trade in general reached the highest
figure. The general trade balance for the five years 1927-1931
was favorable -— for the first time since 1876.
TABLE IV
CHINA TRADE BALANCE DURING 1927-1931
Year Import Export Total Trade
Balance
1927 1,519,398 1,653,516 3,172,914 134,318
1928 1,793,953 1,799,308 3,593,261 5,355
1929 1,898,668 1,980,589 3,879,257 81,921
1930 1,964,634 1,973,128 3,937,762 8,494
1931 2,141,365 2,143,193 4,284,558 1,828
(Figures are in thousands of Chinese dollars of pre
1933 standard: the former Haikwan tael was equal to
about
sJ* 1.50.)
Source: Tang, L. L. , China' s Hew Currency System
,
Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., London, 1936, p. 48.
3. Tang, L. L.
,
op.cit., p. 45.

The trend of China* s foreign trade for the years
following 1931 was complicated by many factors. The departure
of Great Britain and other coimtries from the gold standard in
1931 raised the exchange value of the Chinese dollar, measured
in sterling, yen and other depreciated currencies. This had a
a tendency to favor imports from and discouraged exports to
those countries. Second in importance was the Japanese occupa-
tion of China's North-eastern provinces in the Autumn of 1931
on account of which China lost about one-fifth of total value
of its exports of bean products. Another factor was the Japanes<i
attack on Shanghai in early 1932, a war which lasted for many
weeks and completely paralyzed shipping, commerce and industry
at China's greatest port. Furthermore the world prices of silvei
ceased to fall in 1932, but world commodity prices continued
their downward movement. Kence, the world trade as a whole de-
clined by more than 60% between 1929 and 1933. Total figures of
imports suid exports amounted to U.S. 68.641 millions in 1927
4
and 39.726 millions in 1931, and only 24.179 millions in 1933.
The Chinese index of export prices and export trades both began
to fall in sympathy with the world trade decline. Also this
general decline movement was caused by the abandonment by the
United States of the gold standard in 1933.
With the depression influencing all countries, there
was a reduced demand for China's products. Both export and im-
port trade declined from 1931 to 1934 whether measured in
4. Tang, L. L.
,
op.cit., p. 55.
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decline in the price of agricultural products which he sold,
while there was a less decline in the prices of commodities and
labor for which he paid. There was also an increasing burden
of taxes and interest which were fixed in terms of money. And
with the decline of the foreign trade, hundreds and thousands
of workers were unemployed. This chaotic condition was mainly
influenced by the silver currency fluctuations.
(C) Deflation
During the past century China has naturally been
connected with world commerce and world finance, the country
being influenced by all world movements in the direction of
monetary exchange. Silver was the most widespread monetary
standard in the West and came to China in such increasing quan-
tities that it finally became the standard medium of exchange.
Up to 1870 most countries were on either a silver or bimetallic
(both gold and silver) basis. Afterwards, the shift to a gold
standard began to develop rapidly, and as a result of the de-
cline of importance of silver in the West nations; it began to
flow into China in increasing quantities. The purchasing power
of silver in the world steadily diminished until 1885. From
1885 to 1931, the price of silver fluctuated due to special
conditions, such as those prevailing during the World War I
when the value of silver jumped considerably.
In spite of the World War I, there was a marked fall
in the value and purchasing power of silver from 1885 to 1931.
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For instance, the price of silver in London declined from 60*
3
pence per ounce in 1872 to 50.6 pence in 1883, to 39.75 in 1892
and to 28.9 in 1894, and it fluctuated between 23 and 31 pence
5
from 1894 to 1916. It jumped for a time during the 1/Vorld War I
(partly due to Britain's temporarily abandoning of the gold
standard), and gradually declined again until 1929, when it
reached 24.5 pence per ounce. It dropped to a new lower price
6
of 17.65 pence in 1930, and to 14.5 pence in 1931.
Having a clear picture of the deflation, one may
ask how did it originate ? As we recalled, the world depression
which came in 1929 brought a rapid decline in prices of goods
in the world market. ^ATiolesale prices in England dropped 16;^
from 1929 to 1930 and another 14:% the following year. But in
1931, the general fall in prices of other commodities was great-
er than the fall in price of silver, so that the decline in the
7
purchasing power of silver was checked somewhat. However, in
September of 1931, Great ^itain abandoned the gold standard,
and the price of silver which had previously fallen more in
England than in China immediately jumped in value and begsin to
exchange at a much more favorable rate with the devaluated
pound.
In December of 1931, the value of the Japanese yen
began to decline in relation to silver. Owing to the heavy
5. Kann, E., op.cit., p. 161.
6. Chinese National Tariff Commission, Average of
Monthly Quotations in Shanghai Market Prices Repor Shanghai,
China, 1932.
7. Tang, L. L.
,
op.cit., p. 42.
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military expenditure, the reduction of the value of currency
provided her with great advantages as manufacturing and export-
ing nation to the distinct economic disadvantages of her neigh-
bour, China. Naturally, both the value and quotation of silver
rose in relation to the yen and when in the last month of 1931
Japan also abandoned the gold standard, the purchasing power
of the silver further increased in the world market. Therefore,
a large quantity of silver was leaving China at the end of
1931.
Early in 1933 the United States abandoned the gold
standard are joined the Great Britain and Japan in the game of
inflation and devaluation. As a result, the price of silver
again rose in relation to the devaluated dollar. The pruchasing
power of silver rose further in China in 1933, commodity prices
declining to nearly their 1927 level. The fall in prices was
rendered somewhat less precipitous by the slight devaluation of
the Chinese dollar the new national dollar minted in 1933
being a little below the previous dollar in silver content.
By the end of 1933 foreign exchange rate had changed
in the direction of an increase of value of the Chinese dollar.
The three most important foreign currencies in China's foreign
trade and economy were worth ls.4d., some 33 cents U.S. dollar,
and over one yen in Japanese currency in exchange to one Chi-
8
nese silver dollar respectively.
Tang, L. L.
,
op.cit., p. 43.
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Under the circiimstances of this critical period, the
purchasing power of silver whether in the United States, Japan
or Great Britain was greater than it had been in the previous
year and the same was true of China, Furthermore, so sensitive
was silver in China to world influence that monthly changes in
the purchasing power of silver in three countries were frequent-
ly reflected in corresponding changes in the general level of
wholesale prices in China, particularly in Shanghai and Tien-
tsin. Silver began to leave China in enormous quantities and
price especially for domestic agricultural products ---
fell rapidly. Kence the Chinese economic situation was harmed
and would to be bankrupted by these causes. It was really the
beginning of the silver currency crisis. The influence of sil-
ver purchasing policy of the United States Government in 1934
became immediately more serious, and will be discussed in the
follov/ing pages.

Chapter V
American Action on the Silver Purchase Act
The chaotic development of the national economic
life just described has only been caused to a slight extent by
the reappearance of China's unfavourable trade balance, to-
gether with a moderate flight of silver. Hence, there was such
a tendency to increase the general commodity price and the
curtail domestic agricultural products. But the principal cau-
ses for China's currency crisis are to be found in America's
action in regard to silver.
The following three outstanding proposals were made
by the United States Legislators, for the purpose of the im-
provement of silver value, which have received sanction and
consequently became the law much to the detriment of China' i
silver currency.
(A) The Amendment to the Farm Relief Act (Agrarian
Law) of May 12, 1933. The terms of said Act empower the
president of the United States to introduce bimetallic, and to
accept silver Installments payment of World War I debts at a
price not to exceed 50 cents per ounce. After this Act had been
carried into effect, the silver stock reserve in the United
1
States Treasury would have been increased.
( B) The London Silver Agreement of July 20, 1933
1. Lin, W. Y., op.cit., p. 13.
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China was a lesser power at this Conference, with every poli-
tical group working for its own interest, and showing no sign
of real tinderstanding of the complete economic interdependence
of the modem economic world. The agreement reached aimed to
increase the value and purchasing power of silver. This pro-
posal, mainly to the advantage of the silver mining interest,
was brought forward by the Americstn Delegation. The United
States is one of the greatest producers of silver, while China
is one of the grestest consumers. A difference of interest was
understandable. On the other hand, the Inited States Government
declared a 25% of silver reserved for monetary stock. According
to the above proposal, the United States Government desire for
an open silver market sind partial reraonetization (with increase I
value), was in direct conflict with the Chinese desire for the
2
stabilization of price of silver.
The London Silver Agreement, "the principal silver
holding countries bound themselves not to sell out of their
monetary stocks, more than 40,000,000 ounces per annum within
3
four years starting from January 1934. The great silver pro-
ducing countries Australia, Canada, Mexico, the United
States and Peru — - agreed to acquire from the mines of their
own countries 35,000,000 ounces of silver a year, holding them
for reserve, or agreed not to sell silver outside their borders
,
and to purchase or withdraw from the market 35,000,000 fine
2. Tang, L. L.
,
op.cit., p. 65.
3. Ibid, Appendix A, The London Silver Agreement
,
Article 1(a), p. 117.
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4
ounces of their own silver production annually". Unfortunately
on December 21, 1933 the United States Government ratified the
London Silver Agreement, and agreed to absorb annually not less
than 24,421,410 ounces of silver produced in the United States,
5
the price to the seller being fixed at U.S. ^ 0,64 per ounce.
Therefore, we can imagine that the silver price in United State
market was greater than the Chinese silver quotation. Naturally
the huge amount of silver stocks were exported.
(G) The main factor The most important step in
favor of silver and coinCidentally against Ghinese economy
-
— was the Act of Jvine 19, 1934. A bill was passed by the Con-
gress and signed by the President permitting the Chief Execut-
ive to nationalize silver stocks and the Secretary of the Trea-
sury to purchase silver not only at home but also from abroad
6
at his discretion. Also the President decreed that "silver
was to be added to the existing treasury reserves, including
silver coins already in circulation, until it reaches a ratio
making it one-fourth of the total monetary stocks of silver
and gold." This proposal meant that a large quantity of silver
would have to be acquired either at home or abroad. And per-
paps, the acquisition of silver was to continue either till the
ratio one silver to three gold has been reached, or else, until
7
the mint parity price of $ 1»29 is prevailing.
4. Tang, L. L.
,
op.cit.. Appendix A, The London Sil-
ver Agreement, Article 2. p. 118.
5. Ibid., p. 65.
6. Ibid., p. 66.
7. Leavens, D. H. , American Silver Policy and China,
Harvard Business Review^ Vol. XIV, No. 1, Autumn, 1935, p. 45.
>
I
>
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In August 1934 the United States Government actually
began to nationalize all private hoarding silver stocks (un-
minted), fixing 50.01 cents per fine omce as the price to be
paid by the Treasury. In order to fulfill this requirement, the
purchase of additional silver would be naturally acquired from
abroad. Of course, the price of additional silver stocks were
much higher than the current market quotation. Therefore, the
world silver price rose, and China was faced a new crisis of
her currency system due to the outflow of silver.

Chapter VI
The Outflow of Silver to Abroad
Britain, Prsuice, Japan and other countries whose
currencies have long ceased to be dependent upon silver, regard"
ed silver as a comnodity like others. The purchasing power of
silver in relation to other commodities, therefore, depends
upon whether the value of silver is rising as compared with the
value of other goods, for example; wheat, rice and so for. When
the market price of silver is increasing more rapidly than the
average market quotation of other commodities, silver is gain-
ing in purchasing power. When the market price of silver is
falling more rapidly than the market prices of other coramodit-
ies, silver is falling in purchasing power. Such was the world
monetary situation while the most of the nations were on the
gold monetary standard. But in China before 1935, silver has
been regarded as a main standard of monetary value. When the
price of silver was lower than the price abroad, silver would
be exported in huge quantity, and the national financial con-
cern would be directly affected.
Since the Purchase Silver Act was adopted by the
United States Government, whereby the Department of Treasury
estimated to buy 1,100,000,000 more ounces of silver and as-
suming an average annual world production of 180,000,000 ounces
of silver, it should take a minimum period of seven long years
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for the United States to complete its purchasing Act. This as-
sumption was based on China and India being able to retain the
bulk of their silver holdings.
In the early part of 19 34, the quantity of silver
in Shanghai banks was more than one-third of the total held in
China. According to an estimate by the Bank of China, silver
stocks in the country amounted to some 2,500 million ounces,
valued at 3,300 million dollars. The total silver coinage since
1895 amounted to some 2,153 million dollars, but provincial
mints melted down some 267 millions, and another 268 millions
was also minted down, leaving some 1,600 million dollars still
1
in circulation.
During the first few months of 1934 there was com-
paratively little movement of silver export. The big increase
started in June when the Silver Purchase Act was passed by the
United States Government, providing for the acquiring of silver
for the Treasury reserves. In June of 1934 the exports of sil-
ver from China amounted to over C.S. (Chinese Standard Dollar)
$ 12,000,000 and to nearly double that in July. In August the
price of silver rose to 50 cents per ounce and nearly C.S. $
2
80,000,000 were exported and C.S. % 49,000,000 in September.
In September, however, the Chinese Government prohibited the
purchase and sale of foreign exchange except for legitimate
business requirement. But actually, when the artificial raising
1. Tang, L. L., op.cit., p. 70.
2. Leavens, Dickson H., op.cit., p. 53.
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of the price of silver in the world market changed the situat-
ion, considerable quantities of silver were still shipped out
of country by foreign banks, operating under extra- territoria-
lity and claiming exemption from Chinese law.
Under the influence of the world depression, the
rapidly growing disparity between agricultural and industrial
prices after 1930 was reflected in the accumulation of silver
in Shanghai. More silver was shipped to Shanghai from the in-
terior than vice versa. On the other hand, in August 1934, the
sudden shift was not due to the internal conditions, but mainly
to the external. Most of the silver shipped from Shanghai to
the interior foimd its way out of the country, and ultimately
purchased by the United States Government. So that the estimat-
ion of net silver export in 1934 was | 257,000,000 of which
five-sixths took place in nearly four months from the date of
the American Silver Purchase Act to October 14, 1934. Therefore
Shanghai silver stocks declined from $ 554,000,000 at the end
3
of June 1934 to $ 317,000,000 on December 27, 1934. Further-
more shipments of silver from Shanghai to other ports continued
during 1935 down to the time of the decree of nationalization
of silver stocks on November 3. The net export of silver fig-
ures shipped far exceeded that for 1934.
Silver has been inordinately governed by the Ameri-
can purchase power which seemed to dominate the entire world
1. China, Ministry of Finance, op.cit., 1935, p. 17.
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silver market. However, the American Government continued to
purchase regardless of theserious effects of high and rising
price of Silver in China. Therefore the price for domestic sil-
ver was further increased to 77.57 cents an ounce on April
1935. At the same month, the world price of silver went up vio-
lently and rapidly until 36:|d. was reached in London and 81
4
cents in New York, the highest quotation since early 1921.
Reflecting in part the depreciation of foreign cur-
rencies and in part the artificial and independent rise of
silver, the exchange value of the Chinese dollar has increased
steadily in terms of the sterling, the rupee and the yen since
1931 and finally, of the American dollar since 1933. The tend-
ency towards a higher and rising exchange continued into 1934-
1935. Chinese exchange has appreciated under the influence of
depreciation of foreign currencies in 1932-1933 and in 1934-
1935 of the appreciation of the monetary standard as well. Sinco
1931, it has heen entirely artificial and unsupported by our
balance of international payments, and it was also highly un-
favorable to our exports and deflationary on our prices. It was
obvious that the artificial raising and rapid appreciation of
silver resulted in the inability of our exchange of foreign
currency. Moreover, the rise of silver abroad was more than
that of China exchange gefore October 14, 1934 and the bullion
value of the Chinese silver dollar abroad exceeded its exchange
value in China by more than the shipping expenses. The follow-
4. Lin, W. y.
,
op.cit., p. 14.
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ing table shows the percentage deficiency of the rates of ex-
change at the opening of the market as compared with the theo-
retical parity of the Chinese dollar based on the price of spot
5
at London.
Month Percentage
July 4.13
August 5.08
September 4.31
October (1st to 9th) 4.98
10th (holiday) - —
11th 5.31
12th 8.88
13th 9.72
Therefore, the differential between the external
price of silver and our rates of exchange resulted in as unusu-
al export of silver through smuggling which seriously diminish-
ed our silver monetary reserves. And the artificial rising ex-
change was doubly deflationary; directly, through the appreciat'
ion of the monetary standard, and indirectly, through the con-
traction of the credits basis.
Moreover, the terms of the London Silver Agreement
provided "that the Chinese Government should not sell silver
6
from demonetized coins". While at the beginning of the American
silver purchase program; the Chinese Government have suggestion
for direct sales of silver by the Chinese to the United States
Government for gold. But the United States Government did not
favour China's suggestion. However, this suggestion did not
prevent the subjects of extra-territorial states from exporting
5. China, Ministry of Finance, op.cit., 1935, p. 15.
6. Tang, L.L., op.cit.. Appendix A, The London Sil-
ver Aisreement. Article 4, p. IIR.
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silver from China mainland and shipping it to the United States
through London, largely via Japan and Hongkong. Actually, the
large quantities of silver purchased by the United States
Government was brought from London. But knowing that London is
not a silver producer, the silver sold in England must have
been imported from abroad. It was true, during 1934-1935 10% of
the American purchase of silver were from England, but at least
two-thirds of the British imports were either from China dir-
ect, from Hongkong, or from Japan.
The annual report published by Messers. Handy and
Harman of New York shows that "China has been the greatest
source of silver from 1934, 300 million ounces having came from
China's monetary stocks. Unallocated supplies amounted to 160
million ounces during 1935. It was estimated that 190 million
7
ounces were sumggled out of China in that year."
7. Tang, L. L.
,
op.cit., p. 73.

Chapter VII
China* s Reaction
The general economic and financial condition has
unfortunately continued to deteriorate under the influence of
the world depression with great hardship to all forms of eco-
nomic activity. Domestic prices have been falling since 1931,
and prices of leading agricultural commodities are greatly de-
pressed. Moreover, tne general purchasing power has rapidly
declined also. The depression has come to China mainly as the
result of external force affecting the national economic life,
notably, the reduced purchasing power of other nations and
increasing value of China's silver currency in terms of tnree
leading currencies (Japanese yen, United States dollar and
Sterling) which was influenced by the Currency policy of the
governments concerned.
Since American Silver Purchase Act of June 19, 1934
went into effect and unpreceedented drain of silver from China
had in August already reached enormous proportions. On August
19, 1934 the Chinese Government was tied by the promise of the
London Silver Agreement. The Minister of Finance sent a message
to the President of United States calling for suspension of
further purchase of silver. This the United States Secretary of
State replied said that "the silver purchase program was era-
bodied in an act of Congress which was mandatory as to its
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general objective upon the Executive. Also that under the Act,
the Secretary of the Treasury was required to purchase silver
1
until it made one-fourth of the total monetary stocks.
On October 12, 1934 on receipt of this communicatiom
,
it was evident that for the protection of her currency and her
price level, the Chinese Government could hope for nothing from
the American Government. The Chinese Government following a
twenty-four hours conference and full consultation with leaders
of business and finance immediately took action of its own, it
announced a duty on the export of silver of 10% (less 2^% in
the case of silver dollars and mint bars which had paid that
2
amount in seigniorage), together with an equalization charge.
The equalization charge was to be adjusted daily so that with
the duty it would jsut make up for any discount of the exchange
rate below parity, and so make the export of silver unprofit-
able. Moreover, the Foreign Exchange Stabilization Committee
was formed in order to fix the equalization charge and to pre-
vent undue fluctuations of exchange rates. In other wards, it
was a measure of official control of foreign exchange, and
aimed to separate China's currency from world silver price.
Since the Chinese Government's adoption of equaliza-
tion duty on silver v/ent into effect, exports of silver fell
off smoothly and were at the rate of about C.S. ^ 12,000,000
per month in November and December. The result of official con-
1. China, Ministry of Finance, op.cit., 1935, p. 16.
2. Ibid, Annex Document Relating to the Silver
Situation, pp. 19-20.
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trol of foreign exchange was successful. On the other hand,
there was still a large scale of silver smuggled from Shanghai
to the ^itish colony of Hongkong and Japan, operating under
the extra-territorial foreign banks because China was a lesser
power nation. The very profitable unlawful trade continues to
some exient up to the end of 1935.
While announcement of the silver export was never
regarded as a fundamental solution of the nation's monetary
problem, it was impossible to prevent large scale smuggling of
silver. The rate of foreign exchange still rose to over U.S. |5
.42 cents in the Spring of 1935 as compared with highest rates
of about 38 cents in the first half of October 1934. Silver
being silver, its rising value abroad tended to increase its
value in China even though exportation was prohibited. And
also deflationary forces continued to operate in Shanghai
the index of wholesale commodity prices declined from 99,9 in
3
i^ebruary to 90.5 in July 1935. Therefore, money was extremely
tight by the above reasons. The national economic situation was
most critical due to the continued tightness of money as re-
flected in the decline of stocks, bonds and real estate (both
Chinese and foreign), business closures and unempolyraent be-
came widespread.
The Government was therefore forced to take further
action for the purpose of preventing further economic deterio-
ration. Finally the Government ordered that the bank of China
3. China, Ministry of Finance, Annual Report for the
23rd Fiscal Year^ July 1934 to June 1935, Nanking
^
1956, p« 13.

and Sank of Comnianications be nationalized and brought with the
Central Bank of China as a group of three state governing banks
It set additional ^ 25,000,000 of Treasury notes for the pur-
pose of extending loans to assist deserving businesses, indus-
trial and banking institutions to tide over temporary difficul-
ties. Also in order to ease credit situation, measures have
been taken to encourage reimportation of silver.
However, the result appeared quickly that regardless
such serious decree of the Government has issued, it could only
check the Chinese speculators, temporarily stabilize the price
level, and slowly recover the destroyed businesses within the
country'-.
Further rise of the price of silver in the I'iew York
caused the continued heavy drain of silver from the country.
The export undoubtedly operated by the extra-territorial foreign
subjects or banks, and caused increasing economic difficulties
in China. The wholesale prices in Shanghai which in Peburary
1935 stood at nearly the 1926 level, had by August dropped to
91.9 percent of this level, and by September to 91.1 (as com-
4
pared with 97.3 in September 1934).
Moreover, it was already becoming evident that lower
exchange rates would have to be established in order to improve
the national economic and monetary situations. The various de-
valuated currencies of other countries had by no means achieved
a new stability in relation to gold and silver. As long as the
4. Tang, L. L.
,
op.cit., p. 76.
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value of currency remained high, deflation would continue and
conditions would become intolerable. It was true that a shill-
ing was worth almost 90 cents (Chinese currency) at the end of
1931, but fell to less than 60 cents by the latter part of 1935
The Japanese yen had also fallen from about $ 1.25 in 1932,
after abandoning gold, to 70 cents by the latter part of 1935.
The United States dollar dropped from about ^ 3 at the end of
1933 to $ 2.50 by the latter part of 1935.
In view of this situation, the Chinese Government
was actually struggling to maintain a strict silver standard
currency within the whole nation. Not only would China have to
take steps similar to other governments to abandon silver and
to reduce the exchange value of her currency in order to achie-
ve stabilization of monetary value, the emergency reform of
currency system and nationalization of silver was also called
for.

Chapter VIII
Notable Reform
As already noted, many leading nations has abandoned
the gold standard currency since 1931 and the rapid rise in the|
world price of silver made China's silver currency seriously
overvalued. i'\irtherraore the heavy internal deflation and out-
flow of silver stocks followed iraEiediatel3'" after the American
Silver Purchase Act. During the latter part of 1935, the Chine-
se economic situation was more critical than ever before, v/ith
grov/ing unemployment, widespread bankruptcies, drain of silver
and depletion of currency reserve. These highly disturbing and
depressing factors were complicated by the people's psycholo-
gical uncertainties and lack of confidence. On the other hand,
it was impossible for the National Government to check the
drain of silver from China so long as the metal continued to
circulate freely within the country. The simultanous presence
of all these difficulties was bound to make impossible the con-
tinued trust in the free and automatic silver standard. Finally
the Chinese Government v/as faced with no alternative but to
abandon the silver standard.
Shortly after the Minister of Finance made a state-
ment on the currency situation, many people believed that the
Government would soon take action to reform the silver currency
system. On November 3, 1935 the long dream true, as the nation-
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al government issued a new decree for the silver currency re-
form. Effective on the day follovfing, banknotes issued by the
Central Bank of China, Bank of Cominunicat ions and bank of China
should be full legal tender throughout the country to be used
1
in pa^Tnent of all public and private obligations. Use of sil- i
ver for currency purposes was not only punishable by confisca-
tion of the whole amount seized, but regarded as acts of trea-
2
son against the Republic. Banks, firms and all other public
and private parties holding silver dollars or bullion were re-
quired to hand them over to the Currency Reserve Board, or its
3
agent banks, for exchange of legal tender notes at par.
The Currency Reserve Board shall be formed to con-
trol the issue and retirement of legal tender banknotes, and
4
to keep custody of reserves against outstanding banknotes. The
specie reserves of various foreign and Chinese commercial banks
were handed over to the three state banks for custody. The re-
serves requirements were fixed at 60% cash, gold, silver and or
foreign exchange and 40;^ other securities issued or guaranteed
by the government. To complete the work of internal reform, it
was decided that for the purpose of keeping the exchange value
of the Chinese legal tender at its present time level, the
Central Bank of China, the Bank of China and the Bank of Comm-
unications should buy and sell foreign exchange in unlimited
1. Currency Reserve Board, The Hew Monetary Policy
of China, Shanghai, Janurary 15, 1936, Article 1, p. 4.
2. Ibid., Article 1, p. 4.
3. Ibid., Article 4, pp. 5-6.
4. Ibid., Article 3, p. 5.
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quantities.
In view of above regulations, the foreign banks re-
alized their diversified interests and smuggling of silver were!
incompatible; there was only one alternative for instance -
-- to cooperate with the Chinese new monetary policy. Finally,
the friendly attitude of Great Britain as evidenced by an or-
der-in-Council, signed by the ^itish Ambassador, Sir Alexander
Cadogan, and posted at British Consultes and Fritish banks in
China helped work out this new policy. This order referred to
the Chinese Government's decree "prohibiting and making illegal
the payment in silver of any obligaion in China, and therby ex-
tende the prohibition to all -British subjects in China under
6
penalties". resides, most of the foreign banks automatically
turned in their silver holdings to the depositories in the thre<
leading state banks under the control of Currency Reserve Board
for the custody of reserves against legal tender notes.
However, the Japanese banks were the only important
group which refused to co-operate v/ith the National (lovernment ' j
new monetary policy due mainly to the loss of their silver
business. In Shanghai, an endeavour was made to establish the
Japanese yen as the currency for local Japanese business, evi-
dently using the quantity of Japanese yen in Chinese hand as a
result of Japanese sumgglers' purchase of silver. Karly in Jan-
5. Currency Reserve 3oard, op.cit.. Article 6, p. 6.
6. China, Ministry of Pinance, op.cit., 1936, p. 14.
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urary 1936 various Japanese shops and enterprises began quoting
prices In yen, and accepting payment In Japanese currency. The
great Inconvenience of this plan, however, made its failure a
certainty. Japanese business transactions continued to be car-
ried on principally in Chinese currency, the use of the yen
7
being mainly nominal.
Due to the great influence which the American Silver
Purchase Act had over the monetary situation in China, the at-
titude of the United States v/as considered more important to
the Chinese new monetary policy. As already noted, the two
Governments extended diplomatic correspondence regarding silver
during 1934.
After the visit of the American Economic Mission to
the Far lilasfc in 1935, the Chinese position due to the unfavora-
ble effects of the American silver policy upon China was made
fully clear to the i\merican representatives. In November the
negotiations of two Governments were completed for the sale of
50,000,000 ounces of silver to the United States Treasury to
acquire the U.S. dollar reserves for China at them prevailing
8
world price for silver, ?/hich was about 65 cents for uunce.
And in December a modification American policy was made, the
American Government reduced its buying price fca? silver, with
the result that the silver dropped at I\iew York from 60.3/4 to
51.3/4 cents per oraice (the lowest it had been since October
7. Tang, L. L.
,
op.cit., p. 96.
8. China, I.Iinlstry of finance, op.cit., 1936, p. 15.
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y
10, 1934) in one week (December 14th to 21st.). These two mea-
sures were much appreciated by the Chinese Government. The
United States policy has been of the greatest assistance in
maintaining the stability of the new currency and in gaining
the confidence of the public in the early month of the refor^.
At the beginning of 1936, China held as reserves not
only hundreds of millions of dollars worth of silver but similai
reserves of foreign exchange as well. 'With this strong financi-
al foundation, it could work with full confidence in the adj-
ustment of its new national currency to the requirements of
China's economy. It was evident that the adoption of the reform
program has checked the deterioration of the economic situation.
Then the price level of domestic goods has begun to show a smo-
oth rise. The average of Shanghai v/holesale prices recovered
from 90.5 in July and 94.1 in October 1935 to 103.3 in November
10
1935 and to 106.1 in June 1936. The stabilization of foreign
exchange also made possible some revival of China's export, in
spite of the general world depression.
For the first time in its history China has adopted
a truly national monetary policy. This policy cannot at once
bring general prosperity to the whole country, but it was a
great advance in the direction of a sound monetary system to
improve the nation economic activities.
China also greatly appreciated the timely action of
9. Tang, L. L.
,
op.cit., p. 90.
10. China, Ministry of i^nance, op.cit., 1936, p. 15.
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the American authorities and other nations, which has material-
ly contributed to the successful stabilization of China's cur-
rency as well as of silver. The advantage was not only to the
Chinese people hut also the those of other nationalities trad-
ing with and having interests in China.
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Chapter IX
FINDING AND CONCLUSIONS
For an understanding of the past situation in the
monetary system of China, it is importsuit to have a general
idea of its historical development. Four thousand years ago,
the main currency value of China consisted of the rounded
shells known as cowries. Gradually, these were replaced by cop
per hole coins, which in turn gave way to minted coins. Before
silver came into use as a common currency in China, banknotes
were first issued against iron or copper. Prior to 19th cen-
tury, copper was the principal currency and standard of value
in China, and even before the Chinese Government had abandoned
the silver currency system, the copper coins remained the most
widespread currency among the mass of the Chinese people. Sil-
ver came into use more than six centuries ago. In the past two
centuries principally as a result of foreign trade and the con-
sequent bringing in of great quantities of silver from abroad,
it became the main standard of value in China until 1935.
It was evident that prior this half century, China
can hardly be said to have had any national monetary policy.
There were hundreds of monetary taels in use throughout in
China, and, there were different kinds of silver dollars of
different fineness and weight but of the same denomination in
circulation. Some war lords, governors or their military and
civil successors at times even issued fiat currency. Further-
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more the powerful private banks Issued paper money only for cir-
culation within a certain district. Such activities were for
their own purposes and were not guided by any considerations of
national economy, or common welfare. Since the establishment of
National Government, China's national monetary system was based
on the silver standard.
The world general depression and the appreciation of
silver in terms of the foreign currencies (the pound sterling,
yen and U.S. Dollar), and the conflict with Japan over Manchu-
ria and Shanghai destroyed China's trade and revenues in the
subsequent years. There were two remote causes, namely, currency
disturbance and political failure. Immediately following the
enactment of Silver Purchases Act of the United States Govern-
ment, its big purchases of silver at artificially high prices
pushed China's situation near the verge of economic panic.
However, with much appreciation of friendly coopera-
tion by Japan, England and the United States, the Chinese Go-
vernment apparently decided to abandon its national silver cur-
rency/ On November 3, 1935, the Chinese Government issued the
Emergency Decree which provided for the nationalization of sil-
ver, and for making the notes issuing of the three government
banks ( Bank of China, Bank of Central China and Bank of Commu-
nications) the full legal tender. It also provided for the cen-
tralization and control of notes issued with reserves in the
hands of the currency Reserves Board for the maintenance of
exchange stability. It was evident that the Government's adop-
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tion of this program has restored economy and has caused ma-
terial Improvement. Also the satisfactory results of the deve-
lopments following the new monetary reform seemed to point po-
sitively to a gradual restoration of public confidence. A re-
markable stability of exchange was shown in that beginning from
the week November 4, ly^5 the Chinese dollar in Shanghai v/as
1
quoted at 1/2 - l/2d. without any variation. The average whole-
sale prices also recovered rapidly together with other economic
activities
•
In spite of the great progress made after the cur-
rency reform, the previous use of silver standard has handicap-
ped the national government in both its national economy and
International trade after its establishment.
Although silver was abolished under the Emergency
Decree, we cannot delude ourselves that the reform was deep-
rooted. In fact we may find the following conclusions.
It ought to be found out that the new currency poli-
af- tie
cy aimed te halt of the circulation of silver to increase that
of legal tender, and to raise governmental revenues. At the
same time the selling of silver abroad helped stabilize the
exchange value and reduce the unfavorable trade deficit and
International debts. Therefore the real purpose of the new cur-
rency is to tide over the financial difficulties in the balance
of payments, and not to encourage productive enterprises and
1 . Lin , W. Y.
,
op.cit., p. 131.
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market recovery. The new system was not "based on the coimtry^s
economic strength, but rather on the value of its foreign ex-
change, although China's currency has "been unified under the
new currency system, China's currency has lost its independ-
ence. In other words, since the currency reform in 1935, China
has entered into the sterling bloc. The Chinese currency was
pegged at the rate of Is. 2-g<i. and was controlled by the Eng-
lish pounds.
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ABSTRACT
The brief historical development of Chinese ancient
currency for thousands of years can only briefly be sketched
here. Pour thousand years ago the main original standard of va-
lue consisted of the rounded shell known as cowries, which con-
situted China* s earliest currency from the coast, and was used
throughout the Yellow and Hwai river valleys. The character re-
presenting the cowrie existed in most words referring to value,
price, buy, selling and so for, as well as "tribute" and other
expressions.
In the beginning of the Chou Dynasty the cowries had
been to a large extent replaced and supplemented by metal--part-
Icularly tokens of bronze and copper came into existence. There
were various forms of metal tokens, including "spade money',' "k-
nife money',' "bronze rings" and so for, as well as some rounded
forms made on the model of cowries. A simple form of flat coin
finally survived as the most common currency, the coins being
perforated so they could be strung together in the same way as
cowries. Inscribed coins were being made in the seventh century
B.C., with a square hole in the center permitting them to be
strung together. These square hole coins about an inch diameter
had long been the most common medium of exchange. They were us-
ually made by guilds, town councils, or other corperations ra-
ther than Imperial Government. They were not minted, but cast
in moulds. They are partly still used in some districts of the

country Inland, though mostly replaced by the minted copper co-
Ins in past few decades.
The minting of copper coins began towards the early
of the 19th century, these coins usually being worth 10 "cash"
or inscribed square "hole coins". They were originally intended
to be equal to one cent, 100 of which making a silver dollar,
but large scale production by several provincial mints in course
of time reduced the value to more or less the intrinsic value
of their copper contents in relation to silver.
The beginning of Chinese silver currency in the 13th
century was in the form of silver ingots, the weight of finen-
ess of each ingot being recorded on its face. A standard wei-
ght of about 50 liang (1 lising equal 37.8 grammes) became cus-
tomary. Each ingot, before circulated, was weighted and assayed
by the public assay-office, a very reliable institution free
of state control, and possessing the full confidence of the bu-
siness community. Bat a liang of silver although not coined be-
came a unit of value, circulating either in the form of ingots
or held as reserve against paper money representing a given
weight of silver. The liang is also a kind of standard weight
which various in every city in China, and therefore, the finen-
ess of silver in the ingot also varied.
V/lth the growing volume of trade during the past few
centuries, the Carolus (silver) dollar was Introduced into Ch-
ina by Spainish traders. Shortly thereafter it became the gen-
eral currency for China's domestic and international transact-

ions. The Mexican dollar began to be coined in 1824 and it re-
ached China in 1854. Due to the shortage of Carolus dollars (
the minting of Carolus dollar had ceased in Mexico), Mexican
dollar became widely spread to replace the Carolus dollar. 3y
1911 the number of Mexican dollar circulating in China had re-
ached some 500 millions, and the liang of silver, as a unit was
automatically beginning to disappear.
The Canton Viceroy began in 1889 the minting of Ch-
inese silver dollars, bearing the emblem of the dragon, as the
symbol of the Empire and also coined "dragon dollars". However,
the lack of control resulted in debasement and consequent loss
of public confidence, sind the Mexican dollars remained of first
importance until the downfall of the Manchu regime. Since the
establishment of the National Government, the new republican
dollar began to be minted. The minting of the new Siin Yat-sen
dollar in 1927 was the beginning of a new national currency. In
five years over 500 millions of these dollar were minted, then
the Chinese dollars became coimnon throughout the country.
Simultanously, paper money was issued in China at
least as far back as in the ninth century. The Tang Dynasty and
the subsequent dynasties had issued the paper money to repre-
sent either copper or silver due to the inconvenience for con-
siderable commercial transactions or for remittances. For ins-
tance, during the Manchuria Empire fiat money was issued to ra-
ise funds, but popular resistance made this of little value,
and finally forced its discontinuance. The notes had sunk to

three percent of their face value before they were finally re-
pudiated. In general, this issue of paper money "by irresponsi-
ble autocratic government has had no favourable results from
the view point of the common people or the business community.
Since the establishment of the National Government, there was
a tremendous variety of paper money, mostly representing silver
or copper, which were issued by native banks, provincial banks
and private banking cooperations, and even by thousands of ex-
change shops, mercantile establishments, large and small. V/hile
some issued paper money had very little metal backing, the va-
lue of notes fluctuated with the relation of copper to silver
suid the exchange rate between one form of currency and another
from day to day.
Since the National Government came into power in
1927, control of banking was extended not only by the promu-
lgation of new rules and regulations for the privilage of iss-
uance of notes, but also for increasing participation in bank-
enterprises. The currency situation v/as undeniably controlled.
Gold, though acarce in China, has occasionally been
used as currency in the country, notably under ¥/ang Mang in 10
A.D. and the Taiping Government at Nanking eighty years ago.
The latter issued the Taiping gold Liang coin as bearing a fix-
ed relation of 25 silver taels to one Taiping gold tael. Ten
years after the Taipings and at the time of the great Moslem
revolt against the Manchus, a gold coin was introduced by the
rather short-lived reigme in Chinese Turkestan.

Under the Republic some encouraging attempts were
made to establish a gold coinage, but the coins minted in Tien-
tsin and elsewhere disappeared when the metal increased in va-
lue after the World War I. Besides, the gold medallions or co-
ins were issued only in celebration of memorable events, and
ranked merely as souvenirs.
When the Western world turned incrasingly towards
gold as a standard currency, China's currency still was based
on silver. The value of silver and its depreciation or appre-
ciation were dominated by the London silver market and could
be maintained at a standard price. Besides, Chinese Government
was engaged to pay the enormous indenmity and other duties on
the gold basis. The national finance was faced with this extra-
ordinary complicated situation. A Commission of foreign finan-
cial experts headed by Professor E.W. Kemmerer was appointed
by the National Government in 1929 to study currency and finan-
cial conditions in China. After almost a year's work, the Comm-
ission issued a report,— "project of law for the gradual intro-
duction of a gold standard currency system in China", declaring
it imperative that China should change to the gold stsmdard
system and proposing permanent retirement from circulation of
currency and the introduction of a uniform gold currency for
the whole country. Keedless to say, the plan was soimd enough,
but finally the plans and projects were not adopted due to th-
eir impraticality under existing circumstances.
Before 1933, silver has served as the principal me-

dium of exchange between Chinese people. Under the tael system,
silver was used in varying weight and fineness by different lo-
calities; finally the tael system was abolished in the spring
of 1933 by the "Standard Silver Dollar Coinage Law". Instead of
the tael system, the law created the Yuan as the standard unit.
The Yuan was to have a gross weight of 26.6971 grams of silver
880 fine— that is containing 23.493448 grams of fine silver.
Due to the world economic crisis in every country,
Britain, Japan and American abandoned gold for paper. Later on
with the inauguration of the Silver Purchase Act in the United
States of America. The United States Treasury became a large
buyer of Chinese silver through London and other centers; al-
most several himdred million ounces of silver was poured into
the United States of America. The Yuan silver standard could
not be maintained at a level, and at that time China was forced
to abandon the silver standard. On November 3, 1935, the Chin-
ese Government at last passed the "Emergency Decree" by which
all the coin and other metallic currency were withdrawn from
circulation. After the Emergency Decree, the new paper currency
had shown a period of steady expansion, and China since than
has been on a managed currency basis up to the end of World War
II.
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